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CLOUD COMPUTING ENVIRONMENTS
Hassan Takabi, PhD
University of Pittsburgh, 2013
Cloud computing paradigm has gained tremendous momentum and generated intensive in-
terest. Although security issues are delaying its fast adoption, cloud computing is an un-
stoppable force and we need to provide security mechanisms to ensure its secure adoption.
In this dissertation, we mainly focus on issues related to policy management and access
control in the cloud. Currently, users have to use diverse access control mechanisms to protect
their data when stored on the cloud service providers (CSPs). Access control policies may
be specied in dierent policy languages and heterogeneity of access policies pose signicant
problems.An ideal policy management system should be able to work with all data regardless
of where they are stored. Semantic Web technologies when used for policy management, can
help address the crucial issues of interoperability of heterogeneous CSPs.
In this dissertation, we propose a semantic based policy management framework for cloud
computing environments which consists of two main components, namely policy management
and specication component and policy evolution component. In the policy management
and specication component, we rst introduce policy management as a service (PMaaS), a
cloud based policy management framework that give cloud users a unied control point for
specifying authorization policies, regardless of where the data is stored. Then, we present
semantic based policy management framework which enables users to specify access control
policies using semantic web technologies and helps address heterogeneity issues of cloud
computing environments. We also model temporal constraints and restrictions in GTRBAC
using OWL and show how ontologies can be used to specify temporal constraints. We present
iv
a proof of concept implementation of the proposed framework and provide some performance
evaluation.
In the policy evolution component, we propose to use role mining techniques to deal
with policy evolution issues and present StateMiner, a heuristic algorithm to nd an RBAC
state as close as possible to both the deployed RBAC state and the optimal state. We
also implement the proposed algorithm and perform some experiments to demonstrate its
eectiveness.
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Cloud computing paradigm has recently generated intensive interest within research com-
munities in both academia and industry. It separates data resources from the underlying
infrastructure and the approaches used to deliver it. Cloud computing essentially aims to
consolidate the economic utility model with the evolutionary development of existing com-
puting technologies such as distributed services, applications, information and infrastructure
consisting of pools of computers, networks, information and storage resources [28]. Cloud
computing is a very important paradigm that promises to provide signicant cost reduction
through optimization and the increased operating and economic eciencies in computing
[29]. It has shown tremendous potential to enhance collaboration, agility, scale, and avail-
ability [28].
Despite the enormous opportunity and value that the cloud presents for organizations,
several surveys of potential cloud adopters indicate that security and privacy challenges are
the number one concern hindering its adoption and it will continue to keep some companies
from embracing cloud computing [3]. However, cloud computing appears to be an unstop-
pable force because of its potential benets. Hence, understanding the security and privacy
risks in cloud computing and developing eective solutions are critical to the success of this
new computing paradigm [29].
In this dissertation, we propose solutions to policy management and specication and
policy evolution issues in cloud computing environments.
1
1.1 PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this section, we discuss our problem statement and briey present challenges which are
the focus of this dissertation. More in depth discussion on the motivation, the challenges
and the proposed research tasks will be presented in chapter 2.
Policy Management and Specication: The cloud computing environments do not
allow use of a single authorization mechanism, single policy language or single management
tool for users who use various CSPs. Each CSP has its own access control mechanism that
typically has limited capability to support exible user's ne-grained security and privacy
requirements [29]. This approach is not user/customer centric and hence, can be a signicant
barrier to its widespread adoption. The specication of access control policies clearly is the
responsibility of the organization/users deploying the cloud service. However, not only do
the CSPs dictate how these policies should be specied but each also does it in its own way
[28]. In an ideal access control scheme, users should be able to manage policies to govern
access to their information and resources from a central location regardless of where they
are stored. Having a centralized policy management helps users to use same access policies
in multiple CSPs.
Currently, users must use diverse access control mechanisms to secure their data stored
at dierent CSPs. Access control policies may be specied in diverse policy languages and
maintained separately at every CSP. When such diverse mechanisms are used, they add
considerable overhead, especially since they often lack exibility with respect to functionality
as well as user interfaces [38]. This may frustrate users and make them feel that they have
no control on where their data ends up and how it is used. The challenge here is to design
an access control system that can be used across services from dierent providers.
Security solutions delivered as cloud-based services will have a dramatic impact on the
industry. Cloud computing will enable security controls and functions to be delivered in new
ways and by new types of service providers. It will also enable customers to use security
technologies and techniques that are not otherwise cost-eective. Enterprises that use cloud-
based security services to reduce the cost of security controls and address the new security
challenges that cloud based computing will bring are most likely to prosper.
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Heterogeneity of access policies raises signicant problems in managing them in cloud
computing environments [28]. Semantic Web technologies when used for policy management,
can provide runtime extensibility, adaptability and ability to analyze policies at dierent
levels of abstraction. Hence, it can help address the crucial issues of heterogenous policies at
CSPs [34]. The Semantic Web is an extension of the World Wide Web that allows knowledge,
information and data to be shared on the Web and reused across applications and enterprises
[26].
Web Ontology Language (OWL) is a standard knowledge representation and specication
language for the Semantic Web, and hence it is a promising technology for addressing access
control issues in cloud computing environments [47]. In order to specify a policy, one should
be able to precisely specify classes of subjects, objects, actions, etc. Using OWL gives us a
natural and ecient way of specifying these classes and access policies. The second advantage
is that OWL is based on description logic and we can translate access policies expressed in
OWL to other policy languages and formalisms [34].
Policy Evolution: The policies that are dened to protect resources stored on the
cloud, will evolve over time. We assume that RBAC is access control mechanism of choice
in our proposed system and it needs to be updated to meet the changes and handle policy
evolutions. The idea of role mining can be used as a promising approach to deal with this
issue. However, rather than adopting a completely dierent RBAC system and redening
everything from scratch, we present an algorithm to nd an RBAC state as similar as possible
to both the existing state and the optimal state.
1.2 PROPOSED RESEARCH AND CONTRIBUTIONS
Towards addressing the above mentioned challenges, the goal of this dissertation is to propose
a semantic based policy management framework for cloud computing environments that is
able to allow the users to specify access policies that are applied to their resources using a
unied framework regardless of where the resources are stored. We also propose to use role
mining to address the policy evolution issue. In particular, the research presented in this
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dissertation makes the following contributions:
 We propose Policy Management as a Service (PMaaS), a cloud based policy management
framework that puts users in control of their resources which may be scattered across
multiple CSPs. It is designed to give cloud users a unied control point for specifying
authorization policies, no matter where all the data is stored and distributed on the
cloud. It enables users to manage access policies using a centralized policy manager
which provides capabilities for specifying access policies.
 We present lessons we have learned from a case study where we developed of a unied
policy management system for some real world cloud services.
 We introduce a semantic based policy management framework for cloud computing en-
vironments as an instance of the previously proposed PMaaS framework. Our proposed
semantic based policy management framework is designed to give cloud customers a uni-
ed control point for specifying authorization policies and enables users to specify, edit
and manage access policies using a centralized policy manager which uses semantic web
technologies for specifying access policies and a basis for addressing heterogeneity issue
of cloud computing environments.
 We dene OWL ontologies to represent all entities involved in access control policy
specication in cloud computing environments, address dierent collaboration scenarios
among CSPs, and represent temporal constraints and restrictions in GTRBAC to support
the specication of time based access needs.
 We present a proof of concept implementation of the proposed semantic based policy
management framework and provide some performance evaluation.
 We propose to use role mining techniques to address policy evolution issues. We for-
mally dene the problem of mining role hierarchy with minimal perturbation and present
StateMiner, presents a heuristic solution to nd an RBAC state as close as possible to
both the deployed RBAC state and the optimal state.
 We present a proof of concept implementation of StateMiner and provide experimental
results to show its eectiveness.
4
1.3 ORGANIZATION
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. In chapter 2, we present two use case
scenarios to motivate the need for our proposed framework and lessons we learned from a case
study where we developed a unied policy management system for multiple CSPs. Then, we
discuss and identify the challenges which are the focus of this dissertation and present the
research tasks carried out in this dissertation. In chapter 3, we present relevant background
and related work on policy management and role engineering. In chapter 4, we present our
proposed semantic based policy management framework for cloud computing environments
which includes two main components that correspond to the two proposed tasks. We explain
each of these components in detail. Finally, we conclude the dissertation and discuss future
work in chapter 5.
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2.0 CHALLENGES AND PROPOSED RESEARCH
The cloud computing environment can be deemed as an instance of the multi-domain en-
vironment where each domain employs dierent security, privacy and trust requirements
and potentially employ various mechanisms, interfaces, and semantics. Such domains could
represent individually enabled services or other infrastructural or application components.
In our previous work, we have presented security and privacy challenges that cloud com-
puting raises and how they are related to various delivery and deployment models, and are
exacerbated by the unique aspects of cloud [28]. We have also introduced a comprehen-
sive security framework for cloud computing environments, discussed existing solutions and
proposed some approaches to deal with security and privacy challenges [29]. In this disser-
tation, we focus on various aspects of policy management and access control issues in the
cloud computing environments. We also address policy evolution issues in the cloud.
2.1 POLICY MANAGEMENT IN CLOUD COMPUTING
ENVIRONMENTS
Heterogeneity and diversity of services, and the domains' diverse access requirements in
cloud computing environments would require ne-grained access control policies. In par-
ticular, access control services should be exible enough to capture dynamic, context or
attribute/credential based access requirements, and facilitate enforcement of the principle
of least privilege. Such access control services may need to integrate privacy protection re-
quirements expressed through complex rules. It is important that the access control system
employed in clouds is easily managed and its privilege distribution is administered eciently.
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It is important to ensure that the cloud delivery models provide generic access control in-
terfaces for proper interoperability, which demands for a policy neutral access control speci-
cation and enforcement framework that can be used to address cross-domain access issues
[20].
Role Based Access Control (RBAC) has been widely accepted as the most promising
access control model because of its simplicity, exibility in capturing dynamic requirements,
and support for the principle of least privilege and ecient privilege management [11, 20].
Furthermore, RBAC is policy neutral, can capture a wide variety of policy requirements, and
is best suited for policy integration needs discussed earlier. Recent RBAC extensions such
as credential-based RBAC [13], Generalized Temporal RBAC (GTRBAC) [11], and location
based RBAC models [17] provide necessary modeling constructs and capabilities to capture
context based ne-grained access control requirements.
The cloud computing environments do not allow use of a single authorization mechanism,
single policy language or single management tool for users who use various CSPs. Each CSP
has its own access control mechanism that typically has limited capability to support user's
security requirements [29]. The specication of access control policies clearly is the responsi-
bility of the organization/users using the cloud service to store their resources. However, not
only do the CSPs dictate how these policies should be specied but each also does it in its
own way [28]. An ideal access control scheme must be able to work with all data regardless
of where they are stored. Users should be able to manage policies to govern access to their
information and resources from a central location.
In the following, we present two use case scenarios to motivate the need for the proposed
unied policy management framework of a cloud based policy management service and then
discuss how individual users and organizations that use cloud services can benet from it.
We also present lessons we learned from a case study where we developed a unied policy
management system for multiple real world cloud services.
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2.1.1 Use Case Scenarios
In rst scenario, consider Alice is a PhD student and uses dierent applications and ser-
vices for various purposes. She is working on a project and wants to have access to the
project les from anywhere. Sometimes she works at her oce using her PC and sometimes
she works at home or a coee shop using her laptop. In order to properly synchronize the
project les, she uses Dropbox, a le hosting service which uses cloud computing to enable
users to store and share les and folders with others across the Internet using le synchro-
nization (http://www.dropbox.com). Since she collaborates with some other researchers on
the project, sometimes she needs to share some of the les she stores at Dropbox with her
colleagues.
Alice also has other documents and spreadsheets that include important content like
nancial data; she uses Google Docs, a service to create and share various types of les online
and access them from anywhere (http://docs.google.com). Moreover, she stores some of her
older les at Amazon S3, an online storage service that provides unlimited storage through
a simple web services interface (http://aws.amazon.com/s3). She occasionally shares some
of these les with family members. Furthermore, she uses Mint, an online personal nance
service, to manage her nancial and budget planning (http://www.mint.com). Sometimes
she may want to share some of these les with a family member or a close friend.
Some of the above mentioned applications are used for convenience and others for shar-
ing and collaboration purposes. With the increasing amount of data that Alice puts online,
managing access control for her resources becomes dicult and time consuming. Each of
these applications has its own access policy mechanism forcing users to specify separate ac-
cess control policies for each application. However, with resources scattered across multiple
applications, it is dicult to manage access to them. Alice needs to understand the applica-
tions' policy mechanisms and specify access policies in their specic policy languages which
is a challenging task for her and most users like her. These mechanisms often are either very
simple and inexible or complicated and dicult to use.
Moreover, introducing new access rules or modifying existing ones is problematic due to
heterogeneity of these access policy mechanisms. Suppose Alice wants to modify an access
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rule to a set of resources, or a new colleague is added to her current project and she needs
to share some resources with him. In order to do this, she needs to scan all her applications
and services to modify access policy rules.
In the second scenario, consider an example where patients use multiple medical providers.
For instance, MedicalProvider1 is used for general medicine, MedicalProvider2 for dental
needs, MedicalProvider3 is a heart hospital and InsuranceProvider provides insurance.
Each of these medical providers use one or more CSPs for various purposes. For example,
one CSP provides email service, another CSP is used for billing purpose, the third one is used
for appointment scheduling, and another one provides medical records management service.
Patients' information is stored on various CSPs and they want to protect their infor-
mation from unauthorized users. For example, only cashiers need to have access to billing
information which is stored on the CSP that is used for billing purpose, receptionists need
access to information related to appointment scheduling while doctors and nurses need to
have access to medical records management.
When it comes to access control and policy management, patients may have same in-
formation with multiple medical providers which are stored on their associated CSPs. Also,
patients may want to share results of a specic test which is managed by MedicalProvider1
and stored on CSP1 with some users of MedicalProvider3. There are also situations where
MedicalProvider1 and MedicalProvider3 may want to share some customer information to
have a larger database and be able to obtain more useful information and provide better
service.
From the above two scenarios, we can see some of the key issues: applications and
services have their own access control mechanisms, users need to understand the applications'
access control mechanisms, and are forced to specify separate access control policies for
each application using dierent policy languages. A centralized policy management service
could help users to better manage security and provide them with a better view on access
control policies applied to the their resources on dierent cloud services. Using the proposed
framework, the access control policies can be applied to a distributed set of resources hosted
on various CSPs. It gathers information from all of the services users use and provides them
with an interface to centrally manage access to their resources regardless of where they are
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stored at and what CSP they belong to.
2.1.2 Case Study and Lessons Learned
We analyze the scenarios described previously and discuss our case study implementation in
order to identify limitations of existing access control mechanisms for the cloud and determine
requirements that a policy management framework should have, to be able to address those
limitations and be an appropriate candidate for the cloud computing environments.
Considering the aforementioned scenarios, we investigated access control mechanisms of
some of the existing cloud services with the goal of developing a small scale unied policy
management for cloud computing environments to enable users to manage access to their
resources in a central location no matter where the resources are stored in the cloud. We
analyzed more than 20 services looking at various features for each, including the following:
 Authentication mechanism to determine whether it is identity based, email based or some
other mechanism.
 How users can share resources with other users
 What privacy/access setting options it provides
 What policy language and mechanism it uses.
 What APIs it provides.
 Whether it allows users to change privacy settings using an API or in some other ways.
 Whether we can discover users' resources stored in the service.
 Whether it supports XACML [62] or similar technologies.
Based on information gathered from this analysis, we picked the following ve service
providers for our purpose: Amazon S3, Dropbox, LinkedIn, Flickr (http://www.ickr.com),
and Twitter (http://www.twitter.com/). Here is a summary of how each service deals with
policy management.
 In Amazon, resources are represented by either bucket or object. An object is any data
item stored in the system and a bucket is a top-level container in which objects are
stored; for example, les are represented by objects and folders using buckets. In order
to manage S3 accounts, one should use Amazon Web Services (AWS) login credentials
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that are stored in an AWSCredentials object. Amazon S3 uses access control lists (ACLs)
to control who has access to buckets and objects in S3. By default, any bucket or object a
user creates belongs to him and is not accessible to anyone else. The user can use JetS3t
(a toolkit for Java programmers with an API for interacting with storage services) for
access control lists to make buckets or objects publicly accessible, or to allow other S3
members to access or manage objects.
 In Dropbox, one needs an app key, secret, username, and password to get a token for
authentication. Function getAccountInfo is used to get an authentication token. It uses
the key and secret to get the token, and then logs into the account using the username
and password. A recursive function getResource can be used to get information about all
the resources. Users can invite other users to share specic folders. Function sharele is
used for posting les to the Dropbox server while function deletele is used for removing
a le from the server. Function getle is used for copying a le from server to the local
machine. So, the sharing process could be done by copying the target le, deleting it
from original folder, and then posting it to the public folder or a specic shared folder.
 In LinkedIn, we need an app key, secret, token key and token secret for authentication.
Function getProle is used to login and get all the information of the full prole from
the user's account. Function permissionGrant is used to send an invitation to another
user with his email address, rst name and last name.
 In Flickr, an app key and a secret are required to get a token for authentication. Function
showPeople is used to get the photos of the user. Function getPermissions determines
whether photos are public, shared or private. Function publicPhoto can be used for
changing the ACL to public while function privatePhoto can be used to change the ACL
to private.
 Twitter oers two discrete REST APIs [46]. The REST API methods allow develop-
ers to access core Twitter data. This includes update timelines, status data, and user
information. The Search API methods give developers methods to interact with the
Twitter Search function. In order to use the Twitter API, one rst has to register a
client application that will be provisioned a consumer key and a secret. This key and
secret scheme is similar to the public and private keys used in protocols such as SSH
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[56]. Authentication can be achieved using The OAuth and the consumer key and secret
will be used, in conjunction with an OAuth library to sign every request you make to
the API. The APIs allow developers to work with followers, friends, tweets, etc.
Figure 1 shows some screen shots of services and how users can modify their access
control policy settings using the APIs they oer. Figures 1(a), 1(b) and 1(c) show resources
and access control permissions related to Amazon S3, Dropbox and Flickr, respectively.
We developed a unied framework to support policy management for all these services
in one central place. The goal was to provide users with a unied way of specifying access
policies and then export policies into the services on behalf of the users. It includes various
components such as an interface that provides users with a means to register applications
and services they use, discover the resources each user has on various application services,
specify policies and a component to export the policies into the services through their APIs.
The framework was developed to do the following tasks:
 Get the name of service (i.e. Dropbox ) with the username (i.e. Alice)
 Connect to the service
 Retrieve resources related to that username and display them
 Provide appropriate interfaces to the user to specify access policies/privacy settings
 Once the user species/ modies access policies, it updates access control policies of the
user in the associated services.
In order to integrate all ve services, we used servlet and jsp to build a browser/server
system so the users can access the framework using a browser. A servlet is the Java platform
technology used for extending and enhancing the capabilities of Web servers where host appli-
cations accessed via a request-response programming model. It provides a component-based,
platform-independent method for building Web-based applications, without the performance
limitations of CGI programs. Although servlets can respond to any type of request, they
are commonly used to extend the applications hosted by Web servers. Java Server Pages
(JSP) is a Java technology that helps software developers serve dynamically generated web
pages based on HTML, XML, or other document types. To deploy and run a Servlet, a





Figure 1: The Screen Shots of Various Cloud Services
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a URL to a particular servlet and ensuring that the URL requester has the correct access
rights. A compatible web server with servlet container is also required to deploy and run a
JSP.
The architecture is designed using model view controller (MVC). The servlet listens to the
jsp page calls, runs the source code and redirects to the target page with the results inside the
HTTP package. Based on the architecture, we developed a framework to integrate those ve
services. It displays all of users' resources associated with service and their access permissions
in one central place. It also provides users with the ability to modify the permissions if they
wish. Note that in some cases users' ability to specify/ modify permissions depends on
expressive power of the access control mechanism that each CSP uses. For example, in
Amazon S3 ), users can only share a le with another user but not a group.
Based on what we have learned from our attempt and ndings of the case study, here we
discuss the limitations of the existing policy management mechanisms and requirements for
an appropriate policy management solution that addresses those limitations and challenges
of the cloud environments.
Authorization mechanisms in the existing services are bound to service providers; each
CSP employs its own authorization mechanism that is bound to its services and applications.
In some cases, these access control mechanisms can only address simple scenarios. This
limits the conguration of the application and it cannot be easily adapted to particular
user's access control requirements. Alice, for example, has to use the solutions provided by
Dropbox, LinkedIn, GoogleDocs, Amazon S3, and Mint which may not necessarily meet all
her requirements. These solutions may not allow Alice to group users and assign permissions
to such groups or may not support ne-grained access control policy rules. Most security
novice users may choose their preferred services based on functionalities rather than security
features. However, more security conscious users may decide to leave CSPs that do not
support particular security features. However, we believe that users should be able to set their
own access control policies for resources using their preferred policy management system.
Moreover, the policy management system should enable users to apply a single access control
policy across a set of distributed resources. For example, it should be possible to specify a
policy that oers access only to Alice's family members, and attach that policy to a document
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residing in GoogleDocs, and another document in Mint.
Cloud services are controlled by dierent authorities and often use dierent policy spec-
ication mechanisms. This leads to access control policies that are composed using diverse
and potentially incompatible policy languages. For example, Dropbox uses a dierent access
control model than LinkedIn that supports a more expressive and exible access control
language. Therefore, Alice is not able to specify access control policies once and apply these
access control rules to her various resources such as photos, documents and video clips which
may be spread across various cloud services. Moreover, if Alice decides to move some of her
data from one CSP to another, for example from Dropbox to Amazon S3, then she may need
to specify the policies again. Dierent CSPs may deploy dierent access control mechanisms
and may force users to use their specic policy management tools. This could result in an
inconsistent and inconvenient user experience. For example, Alice, to be able to share her
resources eciently and securely, must learn how to use interfaces and management tools
at all her cloud services which may dier signicantly from one service provider to another.
We believe, in an ideal policy management system, users should be able to specify access
control policies using a single policy management tool without being required to learn how
to use each application's tool separately.
Each CSP employs its own authorization mechanism and the access control policies in ex-
isting solutions are distributed and heterogeneous. As a result, interoperation among service
providers is dicult as services may not understand each other's authorization mechanism.
Furthermore, users cannot have a holistic view of the access control policies applied to their
resources over the cloud. In our scenario, Alice does not have a consolidated view of the
access control policies applied to her information and resources in Dropbox, LinkedIn, Google
Docs, Amazon S3, and Mint. Users should be provided with a holistic view of the access
control policies applied to all their resources stored at various CSPs in order to enable them
to have a better understanding of the access policies and help them in managing access to
distributed resources. Additionally, with the heterogeneity of access policies, in order to
introduce new access policies or modify existing policies, users need to go over all CSPs and
congure access control policies appropriately which makes it a tedious task.
Currently, users must use diverse access control mechanisms to secure their data stored
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at dierent CSPs. Access control policies may be specied in incompatible policy languages
and maintained separately at every CSP. When such diverse mechanisms are used, they add
considerable overhead, especially since they often lack exibility with respect to functionality
as well as user interfaces [38]. This may frustrate users and make them feel that they
have no control on where their data ends up and how it is used. The challenge here is
to design an integrated policy management system that can be used across services from
dierent providers. Heterogeneity and distribution of access policies pose signicant problems
in managing them in cloud computing environments [28]. Furthermore, traditional non-
semantic-based access control approaches are inadequate for supporting interoperability for
cloud computing environments [31].
2.2 POLICY EVOLUTION
The policy specication component of our proposed framework is responsible to keep all
policies applied to users' resources on the CSPs. These policies that are dened to protect
resources across CSPs will evolve during time. As we will see later, these policies are based on
RBAC model and it is known that maintenance of an RBAC system becomes an important
issue once the system is in place [89]. An RBAC system needs to be updated to meet
the changes and new permission distribution requirements. For example, new users may
be added to the system, new applications that need new permissions may be added and
existing applications may be deleted. When the initial RBAC conguration becomes messy
and inecient as a result of being used for a long time, many changes and updates, it is
not a good idea to adopt a completely dierent RBAC system and redene the system from
scratch. Moreover, changes to the existing role set may cause disruptions to the system and
prevent it from proper functioning.
The idea of role engineering could be used to deal with the policy evolution issues.
Role engineering is the process of identifying a set of roles that is complete, correct and
ecient, and then assigning users and permissions to these roles [73]. There are two general
approaches to accomplish the task of role engineering: the top-down approach and the bottom-
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up approach. The top-down approach uses a detailed analysis of business processes: denes
particular job functions, decomposes them into smaller units, and nally creates roles for
these units by associating needed permissions. Because there are large numbers of business
processes, users and permissions in an organization, and also as such a process is human-
intensive, it is a rather dicult task and hence believed to be slow and expensive. In order to
overcome this drawback, researchers have proposed to use data mining techniques to discover
roles from existing data. This bottom-up approach utilizes the existing system conguration
data (in particular the user permission assignments) to dene roles. It rst considers the
existing users' permissions before RBAC is implemented, and aggregates them into roles.
Such a bottom-up approach is called role mining.
There have been several attempts to propose bottom-up approaches to mining roles
[79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 85, 86, 87, 89]. However, there is no formal notion of goodness of a
produced role set. Vaidya et al. have formally dened the role mining problem using the
notion of minimality [81]. Without considering semantic meanings, minimality may serve as
a good approximation for discovering descriptive roles, but generally it is not a good measure
for goodness of discovered roles. Furthermore, the existing role mining techniques do not
consider the existing RBAC conguration and try to dene everything from scratch. These
approaches are not acceptable when there already is an RBAC system in place [89].
2.3 OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH TASKS
Considering all the aforementioned challenges, we propose a semantic based policy manage-
ment framework for cloud computing environments that is able to allow the users to specify
their policies that are applied to their resources using a unied framework regardless of where
the resources are stored. We also propose an approach based on role mining to handle the
policy evolution issue.
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2.3.1 Task I: Policy Management and Specication
We rst introduce policy management as a service (PMaaS), a cloud based policy manage-
ment framework that puts users in control of their resources which may be scattered across
multiple CSPs. Its goal is to provide capabilities for users to manage access policies us-
ing a centralized policy manager which provides interfaces for specifying access policies and
exporting them to the CSPs on behalf of the user.
It is also necessary to address semantic heterogeneity among dierent service providers'
policies since they may have dierent approaches to provide access control mechanisms
[3, 22, 21]. Based on the motivating scenarios, we propose a semantic based policy man-
agement framework for cloud computing environments. Semantic Web technologies can help
address the crucial issue of semantic heterogeneity across multiple providers in the cloud [34].
In a policy management system, access control rules are specied based on representations
of concepts and policy rules. In order to deal with the heterogeneity of cloud computing
environments, these representations should be exible and generic to full various cloud
providers' modeling requirements. OWL is a promising technology for addressing access
control issues in cloud computing environments. In order to specify a policy, one should be
able to precisely specify classes of subjects, objects, actions, etc. We propose to use combi-
nation of SWRL and OWL 2 to express the authorization policies and deductive processes
of the system which may be used in authorization decision making process.
Our proposed semantic based policy management framework enables users to control
access to their resources that may be scattered across multiple CSPs. It enables users
to specify, edit and manage access policies using a centralized policy manager which uses
semantic web technologies for specifying access policies. Using semantic web technologies
help in addressing semantic heterogeneity issue in cloud computing environments.
We also present how to specify temporal constraints and restrictions using OWL in
the Generalized Temporal RBAC (GTRBAC) model. The GTRBAC model combines the
key features of the RBAC model with a temporal framework to address situations where
processes and functions may have limited time spans or periodic temporal durations, and it
is useful for applications with inherent temporal semantics such as workow-based systems.
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We model temporal constraints and restrictions in OWL and dene OWL ontologies that
represent temporal constraints and restrictions in GTRBAC.
2.3.2 Task II: Policy Evolution
With regards to policy evolution, we use role mining techniques to address this challenge in
our proposed policy management framework. Our premise is that migrating to a new set of
roles from existing set of roles should cause as little disruption as possible. So, the goal is
to look for a set of roles as close as possible to both the existing set of roles and the optimal
set of roles.
We formally dene the problem of mining role hierarchy with minimal perturbation and
present a heuristic algorithm to nd an RBAC state as similar as possible to the existing
state and the optimal state. In order to achieve our goal, we use the theory of formal
concept analysis [94], which has been shown to provide a strong theoretical foundation for
role engineering [89]. We also introduce two dierent measures: structural complexity for
optimality of an RBAC state, and similarity of sets of roles for minimal perturbation. Our
proposed algorithm, StateMiner, presents a heuristic solution to nd an RBAC state as close
as possible to both the deployed RBAC state and the optimal state.
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3.0 BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
The US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) cloud eorts intend to
promote the eective and secure use of the technology within government and industry by
providing technical guidance and promoting standards. The NIST denes cloud computing
as follows: \Cloud computing is a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand
network access to a shared pool of congurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers,
storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal
management eort or service provider interaction. This cloud model is composed of ve
essential characteristics, three service models, and four deployment models." [1]. The ve
key characteristics of cloud computing include on-demand self-service, ubiquitous network
access, location-independent resource pooling, rapid elasticity and measured service, all of
which are geared toward using clouds seamlessly and transparently [1]. The main three key
cloud delivery models are software as a service (SaaS), platform as a service (PaaS), and
infrastructure as a service (IaaS) [29].
IaaS provides a set of virtualized infrastructural components such as virtual machines
and storage on which the customers can build and run applications. The most basic compo-
nent is a virtual machine (VM) and the virtual operating system where the application will
eventually reside. Issues such as trusting the virtual machine image, hardening hosts, and
securing inter-host communication are critical areas in IaaS. In PaaS, the cloud providers en-
ables the programming environments to access and utilize the additional application building
blocks. These programming environments have a visible impact on the application archi-
tecture such as constraints on what services the application can request from an operating
system. For example, a PaaS environment may limit access to well-dened parts of the
le system, thus requiring a ne-grained authorization service. SaaS provides application
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software enabled as on-demand-services. As clients acquire and use software components
from dierent providers, composing them securely and ensuring that information handled
by these composed services are well protected become important.
The cloud deployment models are public cloud, private cloud, community cloud, and
hybrid cloud composed of multiple clouds [2]. Public cloud refers to an external or publicly
available cloud environment that is accessible to multiple tenants, while private cloud is
typically a tailored environment with dedicated virtualized resources for a particular orga-
nization. Similarly, community cloud is tailored for a particular group of customers. Hybrid
cloud is combination of two or more of the previous cloud deployment models.
Cloud computing has become a very attractive paradigm, with the potential to signi-
cantly reduce costs through optimization and increased operating and economic eciencies
[2, 3]. The architectural features of the cloud allow users to achieve better operating costs
and be very agile by facilitating fast acquisition of services and infrastructural resources as
and when needed. However, these unique features also give rise to various security concerns
[4, 29]. Several surveys of potential cloud adopters also indicate that security and privacy is
the primary concern hindering its adoption [4, 3], yet cloud computing appears to be growing
fast because of its potential benets [28].
The Cloud Security Alliance is an eort to facilitate the mission to create and apply best
practices to secure cloud computing [2]. Its report, \Security Guidance for Critical Areas
of Focus in Cloud Computing", outlines areas of concern and guidance for organizations
adopting cloud computing. The goal is to provide security practitioners with a comprehen-
sive roadmap for being proactive in developing positive and secure relationships with cloud
providers [2].
Jaeger et al. discuss security challenges in the cloud, foundation of future systems' se-
curity and key areas for cloud system improvement [6]. Kandukuri et al. present security
issues that have to be included in service layer agreement (SLA) in cloud computing envi-
ronment [10]. Jensen et al. provide an overview on technical security issues of the cloud
[9]. They start with real-world examples of attacks performed on the Amazon EC2 service,
then give an overview of existing and upcoming threats to the cloud. They also briey
discuss appropriate countermeasures to these threats, and further issues to be considered in
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future research. Gruschka et al. present taxonomies and classication criteria for attacks
on cloud computing based on the notion of attack surfaces of the cloud computing scenario
participants and try to anticipate the classes of vulnerabilities that will arise from the cloud
computing paradigm [7].
Chen et al. try to frame the full space of cloud security issues by examining contemporary
and historical perspectives from industry, academia, government, and black hat community
[5]. They argue that most of cloud computing security issues are not fundamentally new nor
they are fundamentally intractable. However, they suggest that two issues of the complexities
of multiparty trust and mutual auditability are to some degree new to the cloud and propose
future research direction for these issues.
In this section, we review some of the existing work related to our proposed policy
management framework including Semantic Web and its application in policy management,
cryptographic approaches used for data protection in cloud computing environments and
role mining techniques.
3.1 POLICY MANAGEMENT AND SEMANTIC WEB
The Semantic Web is an extension of the World Wide Web that allows knowledge, infor-
mation and data to be shared on the Web and reused across applications and enterprises
[26]. In the Semantic Web, ontologies are used to specify a domain of interest that con-
sists of terms representing individuals, classes of individuals, properties, and axioms that
assert constraints over them. It provides a structured vocabulary that describes concepts
and relationships between them as well as a specication of the meaning of terms used in
the vocabulary [26].
Dierent ontology languages provide dierent facilities [34]. The W3C standards for
ontology languages are based on RDF. The Web Ontology Language (OWL 2) is a family
of standard knowledge representation languages for the Semantic Web based on Description
Logic (DL) with a representation in RDF [47]. Using a reasoner, we can check whether all
of the statements and denitions in the ontology are mutually consistent [47]. There are
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dierent kinds of OWL 2 ontologies that dier in terms of expressiveness and computational
complexity. There is a tradeo between expressiveness and ecient reasoning. The more
expressive the language is, the more dicult and less ecient the reasoning is.
W3C's Web Ontology Working Group denes three dierent subsets of OWL 2 including
OWL 2 EL, OWL 2 QL and OWL 2 RL [47]. The OWL 2 EL is in particular useful for
ontologies that have large number of classes and/ or properties. It captures the expressive
power of many such ontologies and performs basic reasoning problems in a polynomial time
with respect to the ontology's size. OWL 2 QL is useful for scenarios that include very large
number of instance data, and the most important reasoning task is to answer queries. OWL
2 QL can perform complete and sound conjunctive query answering in a time that is logspace
with respect to the size of the data and it could be used for reasoning problems such as ontol-
ogy consistency and class expression subsumption using polynomial time algorithms. These
two subsets target particular applications that need high performance reasoning algorithms
but limit their expressiveness. On the other hand, OWL 2 RL is able to provide scalable
reasoning power without having to sacrice too much expressiveness power [34]. OWL 2 RL
reasoning systems can be implemented using rule-based reasoning engines and most of the
problems like ontology consistency, class expression satisability, class expression subsump-
tion, instance checking, and conjunctive query answering can be implemented in polynomial
time with respect to the size of the ontology.
The OWL 2 RL provides variety of constructors to describe knowledge and dene prop-
erty semantics like inverseOf, transitiveProperty or reexiveProperty ; constructors to dene
object semantics like equivalentClass, disjointWith or unionOf. It also provides cardinality
restrictions like minCardinality, allValuesFrom or someValuesFrom among other features
[47]. Furthermore, its reasoning could be implemented using rule-based engines that provide
good performance and scalability [47]. The Semantic Web Rule Language (SWRL) can be
used to enrich the models dened using OWL 2. SWRL is used for representing rules on
the Semantic Web and enables expressing conditional knowledge by extending OWL 2 [48].
SWRL is not decidable so we use the DL-Safe context [49] that is a syntactic restriction of
SWRL and is decidable.
There have been some eorts to use Semantic Web and OWL as a representation language
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for access control policies. Yague et al. have developed the semantic access control (SAC)
model that applies Semantic Web technologies to the access control in open, heterogeneous
and distributed systems [33]. The model makes use of dierent layers of metadata to take
advantage of the semantics of dierent components relevant for access decision purposes.
The SAC model helps to achieve semantic interoperation among dierent components of
access control systems. The authors have developed semantic policy language (SPL) for
specication of access policies as an application of the SAC model.
Marin Perez et al. propose a Grid middleware based on Semantic Web technologies
to dene, manage and enforce security policies in a Grid computing [34]. They use the
Globus Toolkit which is an open source software toolkit and a reference implementation for
Grid systems as base middleware. The authors use ontologies to provide a representation
of the underlying information system and the resources. They dene access policies using
semantic-aware rules which enables the administrator to create higher-level denitions with
more expressiveness. Their proposed architecture supports multiple authorization domains,
deals with heterogeneity of Grid systems and enables organizations to use their own domain
concepts without having knowledge about the rest of participant organizations. They also
provide a proof of concept implementation and tested in Globus to show the feasibility of
the solution.
Finin et al. have introduced ROWLBAC, a representation of RBAC in OWL [99, 109].
They propose two dierent approaches: one maps roles to classes and subclasses, and the
other maps roles to values. In the rst case roles are represented as class of users, and the
role hierarchy relation is mapped to the subsumption relation in OWL. Then it maps SoD
constraints to class disjointness constraints in OWL. The second approach is to map classes
onto individuals and bind users to classes through the property role. It models constraints
through specialized properties e.g. DSoD and SSoD. However, a standard DL reasoner can
not detect constraint violations and we need to add rules to the ontology that degrades
performance. Knetchel et al. have proposed an approach that uses OWL for reasoning
about RBAC authorizations [104]. The model can support both roles and class hierarchies.
However, it does not take into consideration SoD constraints. Heilili et al have dened
users and roles as classes [108]. In order to handle negative authorizations, they dene
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two corresponding classes for each role, each permission or prohibition has corresponding
classes for roles and users. In other words, for each permission, there is a class of roles
that has that permission, and then a class of users that has that permission. It is similar
for each prohibition. Di et al. have described another approach using OWL to specify the
RBAC constraints [107]. Their approach models roles, users, permissions, and session as
classes, with properties to relate users to roles and roles to permissions. They also dene
functional mappings between sessions and roles and specify constraints such as separation of
duty constraints, prerequisite constraints and cardinality constraints with OWL. However,
in order to specify separation of duty and other constraints rules must be added.
Kolovski et al. have developed a DL-based analysis tool for XACML policies [106].
Their proposed approach represents a mapping between Description Logics and XACML
as well as reasoning methods to verify properties of XACML policies. Kagal et al. have
proposed a general framework based on semantic web technologies that supports general
purpose policy systems and is able to solve mismatches among dierent policy languages
[105]. Knechtel et al. have proposed RBAC-CH, an extension of Hierarchical RBAC [110].
The authors extend Hierarchical RBAC by using a class hierarchy of the accessed objects
and present a concept to implement this model in a DL knowledge base using an OWL
ontology. The permissions of roles are dened on object classes and then users permissions
to objects automatically derived by a reasoning service. Cirio et al. have proposed an access
control system for context-aware environments designed using Semantic Web technologies,
namely OWL and Description Logic [111]. They adopt the RBAC model and extend it with
contextual attributes. The authors have developed a high level OWL ontology to express
the elements of an RBAC system and also a domain-specic ontology to capture the features
of a sample scenario. They use a DL reasoner to classify users and resources, and verify the
consistency of the access control policies. To the best of our knowledge, there is no work on
time based access control policies that we address in this dissertation.
Alcarez Calero et al. propose a multi-tenancy authorization system for cloud computing
that is suitable for middleware service in the PaaS layer [36]. Their proposed authorization
model supports multi-tenancy, RBAC, hRBAC, path-based object hierarchies, and federa-
tion. The authors also present an architecture for implementing the authorization model,
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describe a proof of concept implementation and its performance evaluation.
Hu et al. present a new Semantic Access Control Policy Language (SACPL) in order
to overcome to the limitations of traditional access control systems in the cloud computing
environments [35]. They introduce Access Control Oriented Ontology System (ACOOS) as
the semantic basis of SACPL that aims to solve the interoperability issue of distributed access
control policies. The ACOOS is used to annotate some syntax elements of XACML, such as
subject, object, action and attribute variables with semantic information. The authors also
add some syntax elements such as priority and condentiality.
Calero et al. propose a multi-tenancy authorization system for cloud computing that is
suitable for middleware service in the PaaS layer [36]. Their proposed authorization model
supports multi-tenancy, RBAC, hRBAC, path-based object hierarchies, and federation. The
authors also present an architecture for implementing the authorization model, describe a
proof of concept implementation and its performance evaluation.
3.2 POLICY EVOLUTION: ROLE ENGINEERING IN RBAC
RBAC is an authorization model in which access decisions are based on the roles that users
hold within an organization. In RBAC, roles represent functions within a given organization
and access permissions are associated with roles instead of users [27]. Users can activate a
subset of the roles which they are members of and easily acquire all the required permissions.
In order to deploy an RBAC system, one requires to rst identify a complete set of roles.
This process, known as role engineering, has been identied as one of the costliest tasks in
migrating to RBAC. Coyne [73] was the rst to propose the role engineering problem and
describe the concept of the top-down approach. A number of subsequent papers have focused
on the top-down approach [75, 76, 77, 78]. The role mining problem was rst proposed by
Kuhlmann et al. [79]. They have proposed a clustering technique similar to the k-means.
Schlegelmilch et al. have proposed the ORCA that discovers roles by clustering them on
permissions [80]. It constructs a role hierarchy, but it does not allow overlapping roles,
which is a signicant drawback. Vaidya et al. have proposed RoleMiner that is a two-phase
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algorithm based on subset enumeration [82]. It rst generates a set of candidate roles and
orders them. Then, it calculates a priority metric from the number of users who have all the
permissions assigned to the role and the number of users who have a superset of the role's
permissions, and then selects roles from the candidate roles based on this priority metric.
Vaidya et al. have formally dened the role mining problem as a matrix decomposition
problem, which they refer to as the RMP (Role Mining problem) problem [81]. They show
that the RMP problem is NP-complete and there is a close relationship between RMP and
several existing data mining problems such as the minimal tiling problem and the discrete
basis problem. Furthermore, they have proposed several variants of the basic-RMP. The -
approximate RMP allows a limited amount of inexactness, which may result in less number
of roles. The min-noise RMP allows administrators to specify the number of roles yet mine
the best possible set of roles. All these techniques are limited to mining RBAC systems that
do not have a role hierarchy. Lu et al. use binary integer programming to model the basic
RMP and its variants [85].
Zhang et al. have presented a heuristic algorithm for role mining, which models an
RBAC state as a graph [83]. The algorithm starts with an initial RBAC state and iteratively
improves the system using pairs of roles such that merging or splitting the two roles will result
in a graph with a lower cost. Colantonio et al. propose RBAM (Role-Based Association-
rule Mining) to leverage the cost metric to nd candidate role-sets with the lowest possible
administration cost [84]. Frank et al. present a probabilistic model for role mining problem
[91]. They show how roles can be inferred from data using a machine-learning algorithm.
Furthermore, they have proposed a hybrid role mining approach that works with both the
existing user-permission assignments and business information from the organization [92].
Molloy et al. have developed the HierarchicalMiner, an approach which considers both
the semantics of roles and system complexity, and have shown that it is able to mine good
roles as well as to generate good role hierarchies [89]. However, it does not consider the
existing RBAC state and denes everything from scratch. Furthermore, it prunes the reduced
concept lattice only based on wsc while the StateMiner does the pruning process based
on GOF which is a global optimization function of weighted structural complexity and
similarity. Also, the HierarchicalMiner does not consider the concepts with both new users
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and new permissions in the pruning process, while the StateMiner considers them as well.
There maybe a concept with both new users and new permissions that based on GOF ,
introduced in section 4.2.2.3, should be pruned. Moreover, if we set the weight factor for
similarity to zero, wf = 0, our approach covers the HierarchicalMiner with the exception
that it allows direct user permission assignment while our approach does not. In order to
illustrate the strengths and weaknesses of nine dierent role mining algorithms, Molloy et al.
introduce an evaluation framework for comparing them [90]. They also propose a new role
mining algorithm and two new ways for algorithmically generating datasets for evaluating
role mining algorithms.
Recently, Vaidya et al. have dened the Minimal Perturbation problem as \the problem
of discovering an optimal set of roles from existing user permissions that are similar to the
currently deployed roles" [88]. They also emphasize the idea of migrating to optimal RBAC
as does our approach and use a similarity metric based on Jaccard coecient to formalize the
problem and propose a heuristic solution based on previously developed FastMiner algorithm
[81]. However, their approach does not provide a complete solution to role migration as they
just consider at roles and ignore the role hierarchy and also according to their paper, the
measure it uses to formulate similarity is very simple and not realistic. Furthermore, if in
our approach we set the weights for wsc to wr = 1; wu = wp = 0, and wh =1, the measure
will be only the number of roles. It means that we try to nd the minimal set of roles, and
that is the measure this approach uses. So, our approach can easily cover this approach as
well.
Gue et al. have formally dened the notion of optimality for role hierarchy construction
and also proposed a heuristic solution for that [86]. Their RH-Builder algorithm builds a
hierarchy from the existing role set such that the number of direct relationships is minimized.
They have also proposed the RH-Miner algorithm for the case where there are no initial roles.
It separates the problem into two steps: rst a minimal set of roles is generated using one
of the known heuristic approaches, then the RH-Builder is applied to come up with the
hierarchy with minimal number of edges. The key weakness of this approach is that it rst
generates a role set and then the hierarchy. Hence, the result may not really be optimal.
Whereas, our approach integrates the role hierarchy creation and the discovery of roles.
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4.0 THE PROPOSED SEMANTIC BASED POLICY MANAGEMENT
FRAMEWORK
In this chapter, we present our proposed policy management framework. This framework
aims to address the challenges discussed above and includes two main components: policy
management and specication, and policy evolution. In the following sections, we present
components of the proposed framework in detail.
4.1 POLICY MANAGEMENT AND SPECIFICATION COMPONENT
In this section, we present the policy management and policy specication component of the
proposed framework. First, we present policy management as a service (PMaaS) framework
and describe its components. Then, we introduce semantic based policy management frame-
work which is an instance of the proposed PMaaS and aims to address heterogeneity issues.
We introduce a semantic based policy specication in order to provide a common under-
standing basis for representations of concepts. This specication is able to support various
policy specication models such as RBAC, hieratical RBAC, attribute based access control,
group based policies and XACML, temporal constraints and restrictions of the GTRBAC
model as well as collaboration among multiple CSPs. Finally, we present a proof of concept
implementation of the proposed approach and present our performance evaluation results.
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4.1.1 Policy Management as a Service (PMaaS)
In this section, we propose a cloud based policy management framework that puts users in
control of their data that may be stored on multiple CSPs. It oers a centralized policy
manager which enables users to specify their access control policies, no matter where the
data is stored on the cloud.
We present the policy management as a service (PMaaS), a cloud-based framework that
eciently delivers policy management services. It is built on the concept of centrally ex-
pressing user's requirements that are applied to a user's data scattered across the cloud.
Such requirements are expressed using access control policies to protect users' distributed
resources. We dene PMaaS as the capabilities provided to the customers to manage ac-
cess policies for services and products running on a cloud infrastructure. The customers
do not manage or control the underlying cloud infrastructure, network, servers, operating
systems, storage, or even individual application capabilities. At a high level, the framework
includes four main components: cloud user, policy management service provider, cloud ser-
vice provider (CSP), and requester. In the following, we provide a brief overview of each of
these components.
 Cloud User: A cloud user uses dierent CSPs for various purposes. The cloud user is in
charge of managing access policies on the policy management service provider which in
turn will be used by CSPs to control access to the protected resources when a requester
attempts to access them. The cloud user is also responsible for registering the CSPs at
the policy management service provider so they can communicate the specied access
policies.
 Policy Management Service Provider (PMSP): A policy management service
provider enables the cloud users to dene, edit and manage their access policies. The
cloud users can specify their policies using various models and specication languages
which in turn are translated by the policy management service provider into a machine
readable policy language. It is also responsible for conict resolution on the policies to
nd and resolve possible conicts and nally exporting the policies into target CSPs.
Therefore, a policy management service provider acts as a Policy Administration Point
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(PAP) and a Policy Information Point (PIP), as dened in [57].
 Cloud Service Provider (CSP): A CSP oers one or more cloud services that are
used by cloud users. A CSP controls access to the protected resources based on the
policies specied by the cloud users. It evaluates access requests made by a requester
against applicable policies and is in charge of making access decisions and enforcing those
decisions when a requester attempts to access the protected resources. Therefore, a CSP
acts as a Policy Decision Point (PDP) and Policy Enforcement Point (PEP), as dened
in [57].
 Requester: A requester is an application controlled by a person or a company that
interacts with a CSP in order to get access to a protected resource belonging to the
specic cloud user. It can be a CSP that accesses resources stored in another CSP.
Figure 2 illustrates the framework and its components in detail which are described in
the following sections.
4.1.1.1 The Cloud Service Provider (CSP) As shown in Figure 2, each CSP keeps
a repository of all the resources that cloud users store and has its own access control system
that makes decisions and enforces them based on input from the policy management service
provider. PMaaS does not impose any restrictions on what access control model the CSPs
use. It means that each service provider has its own policy engine and may use a simple
access control matrix or a complex exible policy engine. Each CSP has also a local policy
base to store policies and an authorization API that is used by the policy management
service provider to export access policies into the CSPs.
4.1.1.2 The Policy Management Service Provider (PMSP) The policy manage-
ment service provider (PMSP) is the most important part of the framework and as shown
in Figure 2, has two main components, the policy editor and the policy server.
The policy editor acts as Policy Administration Point (PAP) and provides interfaces for
cloud users to manage access policies in a single centralized location. It facilitates the policy
management process for cloud users by allowing them to specify their policies in natural










































































Figure 2: The Proposed Policy Management as a Service (PMaaS) Framework
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As policies change and evolve over time, we need an approach to deal with it. The policy
evolution unit is responsible for addressing this issue and we use role mining techniques for
this purpose. It will be discussed in detail in section 4.2.
The policy server acts as Policy Information Point (PIP) and is responsible for interacting
with the policy editor and the CSPs as well as translating the policies specied by the cloud
user into a machine readable policy language. It keeps a repository of registered CSPs
associated with each cloud user. It is also responsible for the resource discovery process
which we will explain in Section III.C. After the cloud user registers its CSPs at the PMSP,
the PMSP communicates with each CSP to nd resources and stores them in a global
resource repository which contains all resources and their association with cloud users and
CSPs. These resources are presented in policy editor interface to the cloud user to help
him/her in specifying policies.
Moreover, it receives the policies specied by cloud user in policy editor, parses them,
transfers them into machine readable policy language and stores them in a policy base. The
output policy language could be XACML [62] or an OWL-based policy language such as Rei
(http://rei.umbc.edu). Since there is no one agreed-upon policy language that all CSPs use,
the framework should have capability to provide the output policies in multiple languages
to support as many CSPs as possible.
Next, the policy server detects and resolves possible conicts among access policies. And
the nal step is to export policies into the CSPs; the policy server rst separates the policies
related to each CSP based on the resource-provider association and export them into the
associated CSP using its authorization API.
4.1.1.3 The Communication Protocols At a high level, interactions among compo-
nents of the proposed framework include the following steps: registering CSPs, resource
discovery, specifying policies, and exporting policies. In the following sections, we discuss
each of these steps in more detail.
Step 1: Registration of CSPs at PMSP
In this step a cloud user registers all CSPs he/she uses at the policy management service
provider. As shown in Figure 3, this can be achieved by providing the location of the CSP
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to PMSP.
When the location of the CSP is provisioned to the PMSP, it uses the host-meta discovery
mechanism, such as one proposed in [65], to obtain a host-meta document from the CSP.
Such a document denes the location of a user authorization URL among other items. The
PMSP then uses the user authorization URL to initiate the process of acquiring authorization
to communicate with particular CSP. When a PMSP receives the host-meta document from
the CSP, it obtains the cloud user's authorization to communicate with this CSP. This is
achieved by receiving a verication code authorized by resource owner from the CSP. This
verication code is generated for purpose of authorizing the PMSP to be able to communicate
with the CSP. At the end of this step, a PMSP is able to communicate with the CSP to
discover resources and also export access policies specied by the cloud user.
Step 2: Resource Discovery by PMSP
After a cloud user registers CSPs at the PMSP, we have a repository of all CSPs at
the PMSP. Next, the PMSP communicates with each of the CSPs to discover the resources
stored in them.
Resources are identied using Uniform Resource Identiers (URIs) which are compact
sequences of characters that identify an abstract or physical resource and provide a simple
and extensible means for identifying a resource [66]. The URI syntax only allows a sub-
set of ASCII, about 60 characters. Internationalized Resource Identiers (IRIs) are a new
protocol element, a complement to URIs that were developed to address limitations of the
URI system [67]. An IRI is a sequence of characters from the Universal Character Set (Uni-
code/ISO10646). There is a mapping from IRIs to URIs, which means that IRIs can be used
instead of URIs where appropriate to identify resources [67].
Similar to IRIs, Extensible Resource Identiers (XRIs) extend the syntactic elements
allowed in IRIs [68]. XRIs provide a standard syntax and resolution protocol for abstract
identiers compatible with URIs and IRIs. The goal of XRI is to provide a standard syn-
tax and discovery format for abstract, structured identiers that are domain-, location-,
application-, and transport-independent, so they can be shared across any number of do-
mains, applications, directories, and interaction protocols. It is built directly on top of the
foundation provided by the URI and IRI and its syntax specication is based on the URI
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Figure 3: CSP Registration Process
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specication and the IRI specication. To support applications that expect IRIs or URIs,
the XRI specication also denes rules for transforming an XRI reference into a valid IRI
or URI reference. It also includes a simple XML descriptor format and HTTP(S) protocol
for uniform resource metadata discovery. Extensible Resource Descriptor (XRD) is a simple
generic format for describing resources [69]. It provides machine-readable information about
resources for the purpose of promoting interoperability.
However, we recommend using of POWDER-S or Semantic POWDER [64] for resource
description. The Protocol for Web Description Resources (POWDER) \facilitates the publi-
cation of descriptions of multiple resources such as all those available from a Web site" [63].
POWDER documents are written in XML and have loose semantics, however, POWDER-S
has been developed to support Semantic POWDER of Description Resources.
For the CSPs that do not support/use POWDER-S, host-meta discovery mechanism [65]
can be used for resource discovery. It is a lightweight meta-data document format to be used
for describing hosts and intended for use by web-based protocols [65]. It contains information
about individual resources controlled by the CSP.
Step 3: Specication of Access Policies at PMSP
Next step is to specify access policies that are applied to resources. Our framework does
not impose any constraints on how cloud users specify access policies. There are various
specication languages and models that could be used for this purpose. In section 4.1.3, we
will introduce how OWL based specication can be used for specifying access control policies
in cloud computing environments.
Alternatively, it could allow cloud users to specify their policies in natural language.
There has been some eorts to allow users to specify policies in controlled natural language
[61]. IBM's SPARCLE tool aims to enable users to enter policy rules in natural language. It
automatically parses the policies to identify policy elements. Then, it generates a machine
readable version of the policies that can be used by any enforcement engine that can handle
the standardized XML format. The policy creation portion of SPARCLE provides visual-
ization features to help the users ensure that the specied policies are what they intended
them to be.
The same system can be adopted to be used in our framework for policy specication.
36
However, it uses structured entry methods and guided natural language which is a kind of
controlled natural language for policy specication. Controlled natural languages (CNLs)
are \subsets of natural languages, obtained by restricting the grammar and vocabulary in
order to reduce or eliminate ambiguity and complexity" [71].
Step 4: Translation of access policies by PMSP and exporting them into CSPs
After the access policies are specied in controlled natural language or other supported
formats, the PMSP parses the policy, identies policy elements, and transforms the policy
into machine readable language. Next, a conict detection and resolution is done on the
policies to remove potential conicts. Then, using the association between resources and
CSPs, the policies are separated based on target CSP. Finally, the access policies are exported
into their related CSP using an authorization API.
In order to export policies into the CSPs, we propose to use the W3C Rule Interchange
Format (RIF) which is a format to exchange rules between rule engines that operates over
both XML and RDF data [70]. It is a standard format for exchanging rules among rule
systems, particularly in Web rule engines. The central idea behind the exchange of rules
through RIF is that dierent systems provide syntactic mappings between their native lan-
guages and RIF dialects [70]. The systems can communicate through an appropriate dialect,
which they both support. In order to be able to communicate rule sets from one system to
another, the mappings should be semantics-preserving. Due to its extension mechanisms,
RIF is an ideal language to investigate machine-readable rst-order logic rules.
In general, for the PMSP to be able to export policies into the CSPs, it should be able to
exchange data with the CSPs. The ideal situation for PMSP is that the CSPs support well
known policy languages such as XACML and provides required APIs to exchange data with
the PMSP. However, some CSPs may not be willing to do changes and may not support well
known policy languages. In this case, it is the responsibility of the PMSP to generate policies
in a format that the CSP supports. It is clear that the more machine readable formats the
PMSP provides and the more CSPs oer APIs, the easier PMaaS would be deployed.
The requester sends access requests to the CSP, and the CSP handles them locally. Our
proposed framework does not impose any limitations on the requester and the CSP's decision
making functionality. The requester can send a request to access protected resources similar
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to any system. The CSP checks the request against its policy base; makes decision, and
grants or denies the access to the requester based on access policies dened by the cloud
user.
Whenever a cloud user changes his policies, the PMSP applies the required updates and
communicate them with the target CSPs. This could be done by push or pull strategy.
In push strategy, whenever there is a change, the PMSP updates the policies and exports
them to target CSPs while in pull strategy, the CSP initiates the communication and checks
for possible policy changes/updates in certain time periods. However, we believe that push
strategy is more ecient in this situation. Since the associations between policies, resources,
and CSPs have been already identied, the PMSP only needs to relate the changes to target
CSPs and export the updated policies into them.
Similarly, whenever cloud users add/remove resources to/from CSPs, appropriate up-
dates need to be done. However, in this case we believe that pull strategy is better because
resources are stored in CSPs and whenever there is a change, CSPs can inform the PMSP
to get updated policies.
The question may arise regarding privacy of cloud user's identity and privacy of his
policies and the concern is that cloud users have to trust PMaaS provider to provide their
identications in dierent CSPs and specify their access policies using the PMaaS. We assume
that there is enough level of trust between cloud user and PMaaS provider to deploy the
service. However, the PMaaS could be deployed as private cloud within an organization's
premise or fully controlled by an individual user to avoid privacy concerns.
4.1.1.4 Discussion
In proposing this framework, we have tried to keep required changes at the CSP side as
minimal as possible. This way, we can make sure that more CSPs would be willing to use
the proposed framework and very little eort will be required to deploy and use it. The
only thing the CSP needs to be able to use the proposed framework is to provide an API
for exchanging data with the PMSP and information about the policy format it supports so
that the PMSP knows what format the access policies should be translated to.
Our proposed cloud based policy management framework has some advantages over
38
existing systems as discussed in the followings.
 Access policy specication functionality is externalized from CSPs and can be done in
a centralized location for all cloud providers. Decisions about who has access to what
resources are made locally and enforced by each CSP. However, the specication of
policies for all resources and services is done centrally in a single location.
 Cloud users use a unied policy management system to control access to all their resources
scattered over the Cloud. They do not need to deal with various policy management
systems bound to each CSP.
 Cloud users use a single management tool to compose access policies which allows them
to have a consistent user experience when managing these policies. They do not need to
learn to work with dierent interfaces and tools.
 Since access policies are composed using a single policy management tool and hosted in
a single location, cloud users have a consolidated view of the access policies applied to
their resources. It is easier for users to introduce new access policies and modify existing
policies when needed.
 If cloud users move their resources from one CSP to another for any reason, they do not
need to redene all the policies again. For example, if Alice moves one document from
GoogleDocs to Amazon S3, she does not need to redene the policies associated with
that document in Amazon S3.
 With existing systems, the cloud user is limited to the functionality provided by the
CSPs' policy engine. However, our proposed framework may be able to apply extra
policies by transforming them into the provider's policies. For instance, in Facebook
Alice can share her location but she is not able to dene any temporal constraint on
that. If she wants to share her location at some specic times, she can not do it in
Facebook but she can do it using our proposed framework. She can specify a policy that
her location should be private between 8 am and 5 pm everyday otherwise it can be
shared with friends. Our proposed framework can export a policy into the Facebook at 8
am that makes Alice's location private and when the time is 5 pm, it can export another
policy into the Facebook to share her location with friends.
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The proposed framework is extensible and exible; it is designed in a way that it can
support various specication languages as long as it can translate them to a set of machine
readable languages supported by the framework and understandable by the CSPs. It can
also be extended to include policy decision point too and perform access decisions and
send them to the CSPs for enforcement. We can also extend the PMaaS by oering policy
recommendation capabilities where the framework can analyze the policies dened by user
and use machine learning techniques for example to predict policies and recommend them
to user. Of course, user will have the option to reject or modify the recommended policies.
4.1.2 Semantic Based Unied Policy Management Framework
In this section, we introduce a semantic based policy management framework which is an
instance of the previously proposed PMaaS framework. The framework also addresses inter-
operability and heterogeneity issues as well as other requirements we discussed.
In order to deal with the heterogeneity of cloud computing environments, representa-
tions of concepts and access policy rules should be exible and generic to full various cloud
providers' modeling requirements. We use Semantic Web technologies to address these rep-
resentations and model concepts and semantics of dierent cloud providers with high ex-
pressiveness. The proposed framework should provide capabilities to users to manage access
policies for services running on a cloud infrastructure.
In our proposed approach, we use the combination of OWL 2 RL and SWRL with DL-
Safe restriction to express and manage authorization policies; they are referred as OWL and
SWRL respectively in the rest of this dissertation. This combination oers the following
advantages:
 It oers high expressiveness by providing a wide variety of constructors to represent
knowledge.
 Its reasoning could be implemented using rule-based engines with good performance.
 It provides scalable reasoning capability without having to sacrice too much expressive
power.
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 It helps to address heterogeneity management and interoperability issues among dierent
CSPs.
 It provides separation between policy description and domain description.
In the following, we present the proposed semantic based policy management framework
for cloud computing environments that delivers policy management services.
Our proposed semantic based policy management framework is built on the concept of
centrally expressing a user's security requirements that are applied to a user's resources
scattered across the cloud. The customers do not manage or control the underlying cloud
infrastructure, network, servers, operating systems, storage, or even individual application
capabilities. Figure 4 illustrates the framework and its components which are briey de-
scribed in the followings.
At a high level, the two components of the proposed architecture are the cloud service
provider (CSP) and the semantic based policy management service.
 A cloud service provider (CSP) oers one or more cloud services that are used by cloud
customers and controls access to the protected resources. It evaluates access requests
made by a requester against applicable policies and is in charge of enforcing access
decisions when a requester attempts to access the protected resources. Therefore, a CSP
acts as a policy decision point (PDP) and policy enforcement point (PEP) [57].
 A semantic based policy management service (SBPMS) enables the cloud users to specify,
edit and manage their access policies. It is also responsible for conict resolution on the
policies and exporting the policies into target CSPs. Therefore, SBPMS acts as policy
administration point (PAP) and a policy information point (PIP) [57].
Each CSP includes a semantic based policy decision point (PDP), a policy enforcement point
(PEP) and its own local knowledge base. The local knowledge base stores all the ontologies
and the policy rules of the CSP. The semantic based PDP component is in charge of making
authorization decisions while the PEP module is in charge of enforcing those decisions.
The SBPMS provides authorization services and interfaces for cloud users to manage
access policies in a single centralized location. Once the policies are specied by cloud users,
it detects and resolves possible conicts among access policies. Then, it exports policies
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Figure 4: The Proposed Semantic Based Policy Management Framework
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into the CSPs. In order to do this, it rst separates the policies related to each CSP based
on the resource-provider association and then exports them into the associated CSP via
the provider authorization API. The SBPMS has several components. The global knowledge
base is a central repository that stores all the ontologies and the policy rules gathered from
dierent CSPs' local knowledge bases. This is done using the provider authorization API s.
The authorization GUI provides users with information that is required for specifying
their access policies that are retrieved from the global knowledge base. The conict resolution
module then detects and resolves possible conicts among the specied access policies while
the policy association module is responsible for associating the policies with their target CSPs
and services. An authorization API provides services related to authorization management
process and it is accessed via the provider authorization API.
The most important component of the framework is the SBPMS. It handles the multiple
ontologies and access policies of the CSPs and uses that knowledge in policy specication.
Each CSP has its own knowledge base that includes description of its users, services, resources
and any other information related to the domain. The SBPMS requires CSPs to provide
such information for authorization purposes. In order to enable the SBPMS to perform the
semantic based authorization process, the CSPs represent information in OWL 2 ontologies
and SWRL rules and keep it up to date.
Whenever a cloud user changes his policies, the SBPMS applies the required updates and
communicates them to the target CSPs. This could be done by push and/or pull strategies.
In the push strategy, whenever there is a change, the SBPMS updates the policies and exports
them to target CSPs while in the pull strategy, the CSP initiates the communication and
checks for possible policy changes/updates in certain time periods. We believe that push
strategy is more ecient in this situation. Since the associations among policies, resources,
and CSPs have been already identied, the SBPMS only needs to relate the changes to target
CSPs and export them.
Similarly, whenever cloud users add/remove resources to/from CSPs, appropriate up-
dates need to be done. In this case, we believe that pull strategy is better because resources
are stored in the CSPs and whenever there is a change, CSPs can inform the SBPMS to get
updated policies.
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A question may arise regarding the privacy of cloud user's identity and privacy of his
policies. The concern here is that cloud users have to trust SBPMS to provide their iden-
tications in dierent CSPs and specify their access policies using the SBPMS. We assume
that there is enough level of trust between cloud user and the SBPMS to deploy the service.
In order to avoid privacy concerns, however, we can use cryptographic methods. We can
use encrypted ontologies, encrypted ontology-mapping and encrypted queries as explained in
[37]. Alternatively, the SBPMS could be deployed as private cloud within an organization's
premise or be fully controlled by an individual user.
The key advantage of our proposed framework is that with existing systems, the cloud
user is limited to the functionality provided by the CSPs' policy engine. However, our
proposed framework may be able to apply additional policies by transforming them into the
provider's policies. For instance, in Amazon S3 or Dropbox, if Alice wants to share a le
with a group of users, she has to specify dierent policies for each user. In our system,
however, she can specify a policy to share the le with a group of users called colleague and
our system exports required policies (one policy per each user of the group) into the Amazon
S3 or Dropbox.
The OWL and SWRL reasoner in the semantic based PDP component performs a rea-
soning process to take access decisions [34]. The reasoner includes three main operations:
inference, validation, and querying the ontology as described below.
 Inference: Using the information available in the ontology helps infer new knowledge
about the CSP. The results of inference on SWRL rules are OWL instances which are
used in the access decision making process.
 Validation: The validation operation can detect whether constraints expressed using
OWL 2 language are violated by looking for possible inconsistencies.
 Querying the ontology: This operation is used for inheritance recognition and instance
recognition. The instance recognition tests whether an individual in the knowledge base is
instance of a class expression whereas the inheritance recognition examines if a property is
sub-property of another property or if a class in the knowledge base is subclass of another
class. Using this operation, we can formulate generic queries that refer to abstract
concepts and consequently the system can recognize instances that belong to subclasses
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or sub-properties of such an abstract concept.
One of the important functionalities of a reasoner is the ability to detect and resolve
conicts [34]. There are two main categories of conicts in policy evaluation: semantic
conicts and syntactic conicts. The semantic conicts are results of using information that
is relevant to the current state of the system. So their appearance depends on the dynamic
state of the domain and they are really dicult to detect. The syntactic conicts, however,
are caused by specication errors in the policy or derived from other rules. Their appearance
does not depend on state of the application domain and we can detect them by examining
structure of the rules.
Furthermore, the heterogeneous environments of cloud computing composed of dierent
CSPs may lead to more policy conicts among dierent CSPs' policies. One of the syntactic
conicts is modality conicts that occur if two or more policies refer to the same subjects,
objects and actions and have modalities of opposite sign. This type of conicts can be
detected from the syntax of the rules that species access policies.
In our proposed system, if two disjoint properties appear at the same time, the reasoner
identies a policy conict. In order to do this, we dene an unauthorizedSubject association
using the disjointDataProperties construct provided by OWL and declare it as disjoint with
authorizedSubject. For example, a modality conict happens if two dierent policies permit
and forbid Subject1 to do Action1 on Object1. If the reasoner infers an instance unautho-
rizedSubject between Subject1 and Object1, due to some policy and at the same time, it also
infers an instance of authorizedSubject between them, a conict occurs.
Semantic conicts, on the other hand, can be detected using some meta-policies that
describe unacceptable situations in the domain. One situation where this kind of conicts
may occur is when a subject can change its own permissions. For instance, if Subject1 is
allowed to change his own permissions, he may be able to perform Action2 on Object1 which
initially was forbidden for him. We propose to adopt approaches based on meta-policy to
detect such a situation [39].
Once the system detects conicts, a resolution strategy is needed to provide a solution
for resolving detected conicts. We can use policy prioritization as a solution to resolve the
authorization conicts. If the conicts occur between policies specied by dierent CSPs, we
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assign a priority to each CSP to resolve the conict. If the conicts are between policies of
the same CSP, we assign priorities to the rules or the authorization decisions. For example,
we can state that negative policies have priority over positive policies.
We introduced how our proposed framework can detect and resolve both semantic and
syntactic conicts. However, detecting and resolving conicts are complex tasks which are
beyond the scope of this dissertation.
4.1.3 Semantic Based Policy Specication
Using Semantic Web languages like OWL 2 and SWRL provides us with powerful expres-
siveness to specify access policies and to satisfy the modeling requirements of various CSPs.
However, for the policy management service to be able to understand the policies, we need
to dene a set of concepts [34]. These concepts are specied in a way that the policy man-
agement service can provide an authorization statement, positive or negative. Note that the
denition of such concepts does not restrict the CSPs' ontologies. The CSPs can either use
this dened set of concepts or dene their own concepts. In the latter case, however, they
should provide some OWL constructors and/ or SWRL rules to map their concepts to the
ones required by the policy management service to perform the authorization process.
4.1.3.1 General Semantic Based Policy Specication In this section, we present
semantic based policy specication that provides a common understanding basis for policy
specication in cloud computing environments. As already mentioned we use OWL to model
this specication. We use an ontology to model and unambiguously represent all the enti-
ties involved in an authorization decision process such as subject, object, action and their
attributes within cloud computing environments.
Such an ontology provides a basis for addressing heterogeneity management issues arising
from data owners dealing with several CSPs and facilitate collaboration among various CSPs.
It provides capabilities for data owners to specify access policies and is tailored towards cloud
computing environments where data owners may have resources on multiple CSPs.
The ontology is designed to be used with the semantic based policy management frame-
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/Figure 5: The Proposed Ontology
work and tries to enable data owners to specify policies that are applied to their resources
scattered across various CSPs which might have dierent access control mechanisms. It en-
ables users to dene policies that are understandable by various CSPs which may be using
dierent access control mechanisms.
The ontology is exible and able to model various access control models such as RBAC,
hierarchical RBAC, attribute based access control, group based access control, hierarchical
object. Considering the use case scenarios described in section 2, data owners can use this
ontology to dene access policies for their resources which are stored on several CSPs.
Ontology We dene an ontology that are used in policy specication and management
as shown in Figure 5. The subjects, objects, actions and other entities in the system are










A subject is an active entity that has permissions to perform some actions over objects. In
the cloud computing environments, a subject could be a user, a user group, a role, a process,
a service and so on. The subjects are modeled as an OWL class Subject. The instances of
this class represent the subjects on which the policies are dened. The object property and
data property of OWL are used to describe attributes of a subject with hasSubjectAttribute
and hasSubjectDataAttribute respectively.
In order to support RBAC, we add the concept of the role to the subject ontology. A
subject's capability to perform a task is represented by the role in subject ontology. The role
represents access permissions of resources and similar to RBAC model, a subject can access
the resources by being assigned to a role. We can use ObjectProperty hasRole(Subject, Role)
to assign a role to a subject. Alternatively, we can describe subject attributes and attribute
requirements of role and if a subject satises the requirements of the role attributes, it can
be assigned to that role. The latter approach is more ecient and is able to provide dynamic
role assignment. We describe a subject performs an action on an object using tow properties
performsAction(Subject, Action) and accessObject(Subject, Object). Moreover, we can link a
subject to a provider by the ObjectProperty isAssociatedWithProvider(Subject, Provider).
Subject rdfs:subClassOf owl:Thing
hasRole a rdfs:Property, owl:ObjectProperty
rdfs:domain :Subject;
rdfs:range :Role.
performsAction a rdfs:Property, owl:ObjectProperty
rdfs:domain :Subject;
rdfs:range :Action.








In order to support hierarchical RBAC, we introduce a hierarchical subject grouping into
the policy management framework. It allows to dene hierarchical roles where a role can be
dened as a specialization of another role. These rules can extend the scope of an action
to a given subject to all the roles that are descendants of the original role assigned to the
subject. The role hierarchy is captured using OWL property subRoleOf. Furthermore, we
dene subRoleOf to be transitive by making it an instance of owl:TransitiveProperty class.






















Object is an entity that is accessed and/or modied by a subject. In the cloud com-
puting environments, an object could be documents, data, services or other resources. The
object property and data property of OWL are used to describe attributes of an object with
hasObjectAttribute and hasObjectDataAttribute respectively. There is no actual dierence
between an object and a subject. A subject entity in one CSP might be object entity in
another CSP and vice versa.
Similar to the concept of role in the subject ontology, object group is dened to organize
the objects. Each object group is a new concept in the ontology which includes multiple
individual objects. All individual objects associated with the object group concept will have
the same object attribute values as the object group. The object group can be formally
dened as follows:





where hasObjAttj is the sub property of object property hasObjectAttribute or data property
hasObjectDataAttribute.
Object hierarchies help in the policy management by extending the scope of an action
on an object to all the descendant objects of the original object. The object hierarchy is
captured using OWL property isDescendantOf. Furthermore, we dene isDescendantOf to
be transitive by making it an instance of owl:TransitiveProperty class. In this way, a rea-

















Actions are dened based on the type of the actions that subjects can perform on objects.
Each action type is a concept in the ontology and the actions are individuals of the concept.
Although number of subjects and objects is large, number of actions is usually very small.
Examples of actions are read, write, execute and so on. As previously mentioned, CSPs
collaborate and interoperate, therefore a lot of procedures may be processed in parallel. For
example, one CSP may perform read action on a resource while another CSP is performing
write action on the mentioned resource at the same time. We add some actions such as
parallel write, parallel read, parallel execution, parallel read and write, and so on to capture
these parallel procedures in the cloud computing environments. The hasActionAttribute
property is used to describe relevant information of action to be used for authorization
management purposes.
We also dene action group similar to object group that could be useful in the denition
of rules. The action group can be formally dened as follows:





where hasActAtti is the sub property of object property hasActionAttribute.
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The Action class binds a subject to an object using two properties hasSubject(Action,
Subject) and hasObject(Action, Object).
Action rdfs:subClassOf owl:Thing
hasSubject a rdfs:Property, owl:ObjectProperty
rdfs:domain :Action;
rdfs:range :Subject.




Provider is the entity that oers one or more services to customers and controls all the
objects related to those services. It essentially controls what actions each subject is allowed
to perform on its objects. We use the object property and data property of OWL to describe
attributes of an provider with hasProviderAttribute and hasProviderDataAttribute respec-
tively.
Provider rdfs:subClassOf owl:Thing
providesService a rdfs:Property, owl:ObjectProperty
rdfs:domain :Provider;
rdfs:range :Service.








Service is the entity that is oered by a provider and includes some objects that are ac-
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cessed/modied by subjects. The service is associated with objects. The object property and
data property of OWL are used to describe attributes of an object with hasServiceAttribute
and hasServiceDataAttribute respectively.
Similar to object, we dene service groups to organize them. Each service group is a new
concept in the ontology which includes multiple individual services. All individual services
of the service concept have attribute values of the service group. The service group can be
formally dened as follows:

















The attribute ontology denes attribute types that can be used to dene the attribute
of entities such as subject, object and action. We need the attribute value of entities in
authorization process to decide whether entities meet the authorization conditions to permit
or deny request. There is a partial order among attribute values in attribute denition which




Target Effect Priority 
Subject Provider Object Action Service 
Attribute 
Rule 
Figure 6: The Policy Specication Meta Model
for the non-data properties of attribute values, we need to manually dene partial order
among attribute values.
Policy Rules
A typical policy rule is presented by a 3-tuple [Subject, Object, Action]. We extend
this 3-tuple to support interoperation in the cloud computing environments. We dene a
5-tuple [Provider, Subject, Object, Action, Service] where provider represents the CSP which
is associated with the subject and service represents cloud service which is associated with
the object. This 5-tuple is interpreted as follows: the Subject associated with the Provider
is allowed to perform the Action over the Object associated with the Service.
The provider part of the rule could be any CSP that stores objects and oers some
services. The subject of the rule could be a single user, a user group, or role of any CSP.
The object part of the rule can be a single object or object group controlled by CSPs. The
service part of the rule can be a service or service group provided by any CSP.
As shown in Figure 6, a typical access rule in our system includes zero or one target, an
eect, and zero or one priority. The target of the rule is presented by a 5-tuple [Provider,
Subject, Object, Action, Service] as described above. The eect part of a rule is the autho-
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rization result allow or deny.
Policy is to determine how to compose dierent rules and policy set is to determine
how to compose dierent policies. There are dierent approaches that can be used for this
purpose such as deny override, permit override and rst applicable algorithms recommended
by XACML [62].
As mentioned before, by having role ontology we can represent access control policies of
at RBAC and hierarchical RBAC. We can also extend the proposed ontology to represent
various constraints in RBAC. We dene a new entity, session to represent the sessions in
RBAC; users can establish sessions and roles that are activated in a session can be modeled
using hasActiveRole property. We should dene rules for various types of constraints. For
example, the following rules represent session constraint rule, prerequisite role constraint
rule and mutually exclusive role constraint rule [45].
 establish(?u; ?s) ^ subRole(?u; ?r)! hasActiveRole(?s; ?r)
 hasRole(?u; ?r) ^ prerequisite(?r0 ; ?r)! :hasRole(?u; ??r0)
 hasRole(?u; ?r) ^ conflict(?r; ?r0)! :hasRole(?u; ??r0)
Other potential constraints can also be dened similarly.
In the following, we present a simple example of entities and policy rules that can be
dened using the proposed language. There are three dierent CSPs namely ProviderA,
ProviderB and ProviderC each of them oers two services and own some objects.
Roles
























Read a sbpsl:Action, Write a sbpsl:Action,
Execute a sbpsl:Action
Provider
ProviderA a sbpsl:Provider, ProviderB a sbpsl:Provider,
ProviderC a sbpsl:Provider
Service
ServiceA.1 a sbpsl:Service oeredBy ProviderA,
ServiceA.2 a sbpsl:Service oeredBy ProviderA,
ServiceB.1 a sbpsl:Service oeredBy ProviderB,
ServiceB.2 a sbpsl:Service oeredBy ProviderB,
ServiceC.1 a sbpsl:Service oeredBy ProviderC,
ServiceC.2 a sbpsl:Service oeredBy ProviderC
Now that the classes have been instantiated, we can dene policy rules such as [ProviderA,
SubjectB, ObjectA, Read, ServiceA.1] which is interpreted as ProviderA permits SubjectB
to perform Read action on ObjectA which is related to ServiceA.1. If we dene ObjectA:1
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isDescendantOf ObjectA, the above rule applies to ObjectA:1 too and SubjectB can per-
form Read action on ObjectA.1 in addition to ObjectA.
4.1.3.2 Multi-Cloud Collaboration In this section, we show how the proposed ontol-
ogy can facilitate collaboration among multiple CSPs. We describe multiple collaboration
scenarios and show how to extend the proposed ontology to handle each scenario. In these
scenarios, we assume that the CSPs support RBAC.
Consider the following scenario: Alice who is a user of CSP CSP2 and has a resource
called HolidayP ics on the CSP2's PhotoSharingSrv service, wants to specify a policy that
allows her family members access to this resource. Bob who is a family member of Alice,
however, is a user of another CSP, CSP1 and wants to access the HolidayP ics which is
stored on the CSP2 and edit some of the photos using CSP1's PhotoEditingSrv service.
These elements are modeled in the knowledge base of the SBPMS as follows.
 CSP1 and CSP2 are instances of the provider.
 Alice and Bob are instances of the subject.
 FamilyMember is an instance of the role.
 HolidayP ics is an instance of the object.
 Read and Edit are instances of the action.
 PhotoSharingSrv and PhotoEditingSrv are instances of the service.
The policy is dened as [Any; FamilyMember;HolidayP ics; Read; PhotoEditingSrv]
meaning that any user who is assigned to the role FamilyMember is allowed to read the
HolidayP ics which is associated with the PhotoSharingSrv service.
This policy is straightforward for users of the CSP2 who are assigned to the FamilyMember
role, since the HolidayP ics is stored on the CSP2. However, users of other CSPs who are
FamilyMember of Alice also should be given access to the HolidayP ics.
We take CSP1 as an example here and assume that Bob who is a user of the CSP1 and
a FamilyMember of Alice wants to access the HolidayP ics on the CSP2. In order to do
this, CSP1 and CSP2 should collaborate with each other. The process is as follows:
57
 To make resources accessible by users from collaborating CSPs, CSPs CSP1 and CSP2
come to an agreement regarding the sharing of the resources.
 A contract is established for CSP1 to access CSP2's resources.
 CSP1 gets the resource description from the knowledge base of the SBPMS.
 CSP2 creates a \virtual user", CollaboratorCSP1, to represent authorized users from
CSP1 for future resources invocations.
 CSP2 associates CollaboratorCSP1 to a role with appropriate permissions, FamilyMember.
Note that details of agreement and contract establishment is beyond scope of this disserta-
tion; some existing work in the literature can be used for this purpose [40, 41].
The policy is in the SBPMS and since the resource in the rule is related to the CSP2,
other CSPs cannot see the rule for privacy reasons. The SBPMS should not by default share
information about resources with CSPs other the one that the resource is stored on. The
data owner may not want to allow other CSPs to see information about resources stored
on one specic CSP. In order to collaborate, however, there needs to be a way to share
information about resources which could be accessible to collaborating parties.
In order to preserve privacy of resources, data owners can determine via dened policies
which CSPs can have access to which part of the knowledge base. Once the policies are
dened by data owners, the SBPMS determines which CSPs may be allowed to access the
resources and information about those resources is shared with corresponding CSPs. When
the contract is established between the CSP1 and the CSP2, the SBPMS shares policies of
the associated resources with the CSP1 too. In the above example, after Alice denes the
policy on the HolidayP ics, the SBPMS using its knowledge base can determine that CSP1
has users who are FamilyMember of Alice and share information about the HolidayP ics
with the CSP1 too.
Once the CSPs have established a sharing agreement, the following process is carried out
at runtime:
 CSP1 delivers a ticket to its user, Bob, proving that he is authorized to access CSP2's
resource.
 In CSP2's side, Bob presents the ticket proving that he is authorized by CSP1.
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 CSP2 veries the contract rule and assigns the virtual user CollaboratorCSP1 to Bob
and he will thus be considered as an internal user having internal permissions.
In this way, the same policy is used for both internal and external users.
The above scenario is when the access request is made at the CSP where the resource is
stored on and policy decision making is done locally at the CSP. Another scenario is when
policy decisions are made at the SBPMS and only enforcement is done by the CSP. In this
case, the access request is sent to the SBPMS and it has all the information about resources,
so there is no need for CSP1 and CSP2 to negotiate for sharing resources. However, we still
need the virtual user at the CSP2 to represent authorized users from CSP1. Also there is
no need for Bob to get a ticket from CSP1 and present to CSP2 as the SBPMS has all the
required information and can decide whether Bob is authorized according to the policy. The
process is as follows:
 A contract is established for CSP1 to access CSP2's resources.
 CSP2 creates a \virtual user", CollaboratorCSP1, to represent authorized users from
CSP1 for future resources invocations.
 CSP2 associates CollaboratorCSP1 to a role with appropriate permissions, FamilyMember.
 CSP2 assigns the virtual user CollaboratorCSP1 to Bob and he will thus be considered
as an internal user having internal permissions.
We extend the ontology to facilitate interoperation between CSPs and show how to map
information in order to enable interoperation.
Assuming RBAC is access control mechanism of choice, in addition to inheritance re-
lationships among roles which are modeled using subRoleOf property, we introduce an-
other relationship for mapping between roles of dierence providers. We also dene the
following properties to show state of a role. These are modeled using attributes for a role
and EnabledRole indicates that subjects/ users who are authorized for the role can acti-
vate the role, DisabledRole indicates that the role can not be activated in a session, while
ActivatedRole indicates that there is at least one user who has activated the role.
In the ontology, the Provider determines which CSP domain the role belongs to; we add










Figure 7: The Collaboration Scenario With Mediator
also add the property RoleMappingEnabled to the class Role and use it to model the role
mapping relationships.
In the rst scenario, there is an entity that mediates accesses to individual systems
through a global policy. In this situation, the access control and interoperation needs are
typically predened, and a global policy is created by integrating all the individual policies
to facilitate such interoperation needs.
As shown in the Figure 7, the global roles are mapped to the local roles usingRoleMappingEnabled
property. The global roles are stored in the SBPMS and the local roles on the CSPs. The
solid lines indicate inheritance relationship among roles where the dashed lined describe role
mapping among various CSPs.
We dene the followings to map the global role to the local roles and describe the seman-
tics for interoperation. The SBPMS is dened as a global domain to contain global roles and
is an instance of the Provider; the GR is dened as an instance of the Role. The followings










Figure 8: The Dynamic Collaboration Scenario
GR RoleMappingEnabled r21
GR RoleMappingEnabled r31
Note that in this case, the SBPMS can act as mediator and manage collaboration require-
ments among multiple CSPs. As mentioned before, the global roles are generated and stored
in the SBPMS; then the SBPMS exports appropriate local roles into the CSPs to facilitate
collaboration. Alternatively, the collaboration can be done among multiple instances of the
SBPMS. For example, if dierent organizations deploy their own instances of the SBPMS
and then want to collaborate, one of the SBPMSs can act as mediator and facilitate the
collaboration process.
In the second scenario, there is no mediator entity and the collaborator CSPs dynamically
come together to share information for a period of time. The role mapping relationships can
be dened similar to the previous scenario. However, in such interoperation scenarios, the
role mapping relationships may introduce a cycle that enables a subject lower in the access
control hierarchy to acquire the permissions of a subject that is higher in the hierarchy [45].
For example, as shown in Figure 8 if we add the red dashed line ( i.e., edge between r24 and
r11) as a new interoperation link, users that are originally authorized for role r24 and not for
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role r23, now can get authorized for the role r23 through the role mapping relationships from
role r24 to role r11 to role r23.
In order to prevent these situations, we must dene rules to restrict propertyRoleMappingEnabled
and prevent inheritance cyclic conicts [45]. For example, in Figure 8 the red dashed line
mapping between role r24 and role r11 cannot be established.
The following three situations are cases where cyclic conicts can happen if we add a
new role mapping relationship between role r1 and role r2:
 A role mapping relationship already exists between junior role of r1 and senior role of r2.
 A role mapping relationship already exists between junior role of r1 and role r2.
 A role mapping relationship already exists between role r1 and senior role of r2.
The following rules can be used to capture each of these cases [45].
 subRole(?r1; ?r0) ^ subRole(?r"; ?r2) ^RoleMappingEnabled(?r0 ; ?r")
! :RoleMappingEnabled(?r2; ?r1)
 subRole(?r1; ?r0) ^RoleMappingEnabled(?r0 ; ?r2)! :RoleMappingEnabled(?r2; ?r1)
 subRole(?r"; ?r2) ^RoleMappingEnabled(?r1; ?r")! :RoleMappingEnabled(?r2; ?r1)
Similar to the case with mediator, collaboration could be done among multiple CSPs
or multiple SBPMSs. The process is same in both cases; the parties can come together
dynamically and collaborate based on their needs. Secure interoperation such as these have
complexity issues, which is outside the scope of this dissertation. We refer the interested
readers to [43].
4.1.3.3 OWL-GTRBAC: Specication and Enforcement of Temporal Constraints
using OWL In this section, we show how to model temporal constraints and restrictions
in the Generalized Temporal Role Based Access Control (GTRBAC) model using OWL.
We rst provide an overview of the GTRBAC model and its temporal constraints; Then we
dene OWL ontologies that represent these temporal constraints in GTRBAC.
Overview: GTRBAC
The GTRBAC model is an extension of Temporal RBAC (TRBAC) which is an RBAC
extension to address temporal constraints [26]. In particular, GTRBAC model allows one to
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express periodic and duration constraints on roles, user-role assignments, and role-permission
assignments. Numerous activation constraints including cardinality constraints and maxi-
mum active duration constraints can lead to further restriction of activation of a role in an
interval. The GTRBAC model extends the structure of the TRBAC model such that its
features including event and trigger expressions subsume those of TRBAC.
Temporal Constraints in GTRBAC: In GTRBAC, a role can have one of the three
states: disabled, enabled, and active. Being in disabled state means that a user cannot
acquire the permissions associated with the role. A role in the disabled state can be enabled.
When a role is in enabled state, users who are authorized to use the role at the time of
the request can activate the role. If a user activates a role in enabled state, the state of
the role becomes active. The active state indicates that there is at least one user who has
activated the role. If a disabling event occurs, roles in the enabled or active state transit to
the disabled state. The model allows the specication of the following types of constraints:
temporal constraints on role enabling, user-role, and role-permission assignments, activation
constraints, runtime events, constraint enabling expressions, and triggers. Priorities are
associated with each event in GTRBAC. (Prios;) is dened as a totally ordered set of
priorities. In GTRBAC, event expressions, priorities, and status predicates are used to
express the constraints.
Periodicity and Duration Constraints on Role Enabling and Assignments: The
model uses periodicity constraints to specify the intervals. Periodicity constraints are inter-
vals during which a role can be enabled or disabled, and during which a user-role assignment
or a role permission assignment is valid. Generally, periodicity constraint expressions are
specied by (I; P; pr : E). The pair (I; P ) species the intervals during which an event
E takes place. E can be one of the assignment events: \assignp=deassignp p to r" or
\assignu=deassignu u to r" or a role enabling event: \enable/disable r". pr indicates the
priority of event.
The model uses duration constraints to specify durations for which enabling or assign-
ment of a role is valid. In case of an event occurrence, the duration constraint associated with
the event validates the event for the specied duration only. Generally, the duration con-
straint expressions for role enabling and assignment are specied by ([(I; P )jD]; Dx; pr : E),
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Table 1: GTRBAC Example: Access Policy for Medical Information System
1 a (DayTime, enable DayDoctor), (NightTime, enable NightDoctor)
b ((M, W, F), assignu, Adams to DayDoctor),
((T, Th, S, Su), assignu, Bill to DayDoctor)
c (Everyday between 10am-3pm, assignu, Carol to DayDoctor)
2 a (assignu Ami to NurseInTraining), (assignu Elizabeth to DayNurse)
b c1=(6 hours, 2 hours, enable NurseInTraining)
3 a (enable DayNurse ! enable c1)
b (activate DayNurse for Elizabeth ! enable NurseInTraining after 10 min)
c (enable NightDoctor ! enable NightNurse after 10 min),
(disable NightDoctor ! disable NightNurse after 10 min)
where x is eitherR, U , or P , corresponding to events: \enable/disable r," \assignu=deassignu
r to u," and \assignp=deassignp p to r," respectively. D and Dx refer to the durations such
that D  Dx. The symbol \|" between (I; P ) and D indicates that either (I; P ) or D is
specied. The square bracket in [(I; P )jD] implies that this parameter is optional.
Temporal Constraints on Role Activation: Duration constraints can be applied on
role activations whereas periodicity constraints on role activations should not be applied.
The duration constraints can be classied into two types: total active duration constraint
and maximum duration per activation constraint. The total active duration constraint on
a role restricts the number of the role's activation duration in a given period to a specied
value. The total active duration can be specied on per-role and per-user-role basis. Per-role
constraint restricts the total active duration for a role, while per-user-role constraint restricts
the total active duration for a role by a particular user.
Example Scenario:
To illustrate our approach we use a simple scenario from a medical information system
that is adopted from [98]. The example is shown in Table 1. In row 1a, the enabling times of
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DayDoctor and NightDoctor roles are specied as a periodicity constraint. The (I; P ) forms
for DayTime (9:00 a.m.-9:00 p.m.) and NightTime (9:00 p.m.-9:00 a.m.) are as follows:
DayT ime = ([12=1=2008;1]; all:Days+ 10:Hours . 12:Hours) and
NightT ime = ([12=1=2008;1]; all:Days+ 22:Hours . 12:Hours
In constraint 1b, Adams is assigned to the role of DayDoctor on Mondays, Wednesdays,
and Fridays, whereas Bill is assigned to this role on Tuesdays, Thursdays, Saturdays, and
Sundays. The assignment in constraint 1c indicates that Carol can assume the DayDoctor
role everyday between 10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. Constraint 2b species a duration constraint
of 2 hours for the enabling time of the NurseInTraining role, but this constraint is valid only
for 6 hours after the constraint c1 is enabled. Consequently, once the NurseInTraining role
is enabled, Ami can activate the NurseInTraining role at the most for two hours.
Trigger 3a indicates that the constraint c1 in row 2b is enabled once the DayNurse is
enabled. As a result, the NurseInTraining role can be enabled within 6 hours. Trigger
3b indicates that 10 min after Elizabeth activates the DayNurse role, the NurseInTraining
role is enabled for a period of 2 hours. As a result, a nurse-in-training can have access to
the system only if Elizabeth is present in the system. In other words, once the roles are
assumed, Elizabeth acts as a training supervisor for a nurse-in-training. Note that Elizabeth
can activate the DayNurse role multiple times within a duration of 6 hours after the DayNurse
role is enabled.
Temporal Constraints in OWL
In this section we describe OWL ontology that conceptualize temporal constraints intro-
duced in GTRBAC. The ontology denes restrictions and constraints in GTRBAC including
activation constraints, cardinality constraints, and temporal constraints as shown in the
Figure 9.
We create classes representing basic RBAC components (i.e., user, role, etc) as follows.
The users are modeled as an OWL class User. The instances of this class represent the
users/subjects on which the policies are dened. The association between a user and a role
is dened by the ObjectProperty hasRole(User, Role). Moreover, we can link a user to a
permission by the ObjectProperty hasPermission (User, Permission).
User rdfs:subClassOf owl:Thing
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Figure 9: The GTRBAC Ontology
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hasRole a rdfs:Property, owl:ObjectProperty
rdfs:domain :User;
rdfs:range :Role.
hasPermission a rdfs:Property, owl:ObjectProperty
rdfs:domain :User;
rdfs:range :Permission.
We dene three classes Action, Object and Permission to represent actions, objects/resources
and permissions respectively. The Permission class binds a user to an action-object using




hasAction a rdfs:Property, owl:FunctionalProperty
rdfs:domain :Permission;
rdfs:range :Action.
hasObject a rdfs:Property, owl:FunctionalProperty
rdfs:domain :Permission;
rdfs:range :Object.
In order to represent a role hierarchy hR;i, we model roles as an OWL class Role,
and all the roles in R as instances of this class. The  relation is represent by the OWL
property subRoleOf(Role, Role). Furthermore, we dene subRoleOf to be transitive by mak-
ing it an instance of owl:TransitiveProperty class. In this way, a reasoner can infer that if
subRoleOf(Ri; Rj) and subRoleOf(Rj; Rk), then subRoleOf(Ri; Rk). For example, we can
model the relation between Professor and AssistantProfessor by adding to the ontology the
property subRoleOf( Assistant Professor, Professor). The association between a role and a
permission can be dened by ObjectProperty hasPermission(Role, Permission).
Role rdfs:subClassOf owl:Thing




Figure 10: The Periodic Expressions in GTRBAC
hasPermission a rdfs:Property, owl:ObjectProperty
rdfs:domain :Role;
rdfs:range :Permission.
The rest of this section describes the ontology which conceptualizes temporal constraints
dened in the GTRBAC model.
Periodic Expressions: Periodic expressions are the basis for representing temporal
constraints and shown in Figure 10. Calendar classes represent temporal units (i.e. year,
month, week, day, and hour). Using the CompositeCalendar, it is possible to dene temporal








year a rdfs:Property, owl:ObjectProperty
rdfs:domain : CompositCalendar;
rdfs:range : YearCalendar.
month a rdfs:Property, owl:ObjectProperty
rdfs:domain : CompositCalendar;
rdfs:range : MonthCalendar.
week a rdfs:Property, owl:ObjectProperty
rdfs:domain : CompositCalendar;
rdfs:range : WeekCalendar.
day a rdfs:Property, owl:ObjectProperty
rdfs:domain : CompositCalendar;
rdfs:range : DayCalendar.
hour a rdfs:Property, owl:ObjectProperty
rdfs:domain : CompositCalendar;
rdfs:range : HourCalendar.
Interval class is dened with two properties, beginTime and endTime as follows.
Interval rdfs:subClassOf owl:Thing
beginTime a rdfs:Property, owl:FunctionalProperty
rdfs:domain : Interval;
rdfs:range :date.
endTime a rdfs:Property, owl:FunctionalProperty
rdfs:domain : Interval;
rdfs:range : date.
The PeridociExpression class represents duration, for example 10 hours from 2009-06-09,
10.am.
PeriodicExpression rdfs:subClassOf owl:Thing
baseCalendar a rdfs:Property, owl:ObjectProperty
rdfs:domain : PeriodicExpression;
rdfs:range : CompositCalendar.
durationUnit a rdfs:Property, owl:DataTypeProperty
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rdfs:domain : PeriodicExpression;
rdfs:range : String, owl:DataRange:fYear, Month, Week, Day, Hourg.
durationVariable a rdfs:Property, owl:FunctionalProperty
rdfs:domain : PeriodicExpression;
rdfs:range : Integer.
The PeriodicTime class is conceptualized by hasInterval and hasPeridociExpression prop-
erties.
PeriodicTime rdfs:subClassOf owl:Thing
hasInterval a rdfs:Property, owl:ObjectProperty
rdfs:domain : PeriodicTime;
rdfs:range : Interval.
hasPeriodicExpression a rdfs:Property, owl:ObjectProperty
rdfs:domain : PeriodicTime;
rdfs:range : PeriodicExpression.
Events in GTRBAC: In this section, we represent various types of events dened in
the GTRBAC model as shown in Figure 11. Each Event class has properties related to role,
user, or permission depending on the type of relation being represented.
Event rdfs:subClassOf owl:Thing
UserRoleAssignment rdfs:subClassOf Event
hasUser a rdfs:Property, owl:ObjectProperty
rdfs:domain : UserRoleAssignment;
rdfs:range : User.
hasRole a rdfs:Property, owl:ObjectProperty
rdfs:domain : UserRoleAssignment;
rdfs:range : Role.
Similarly, we dene other events such as UserRoleDeassignment, RolePermissionAs-
signment, RolePermissionDeassignment, RoleEnabling, RoleDisabling, RoleActi-
vation, ConstraintEnabling, and ConstraintDisabling.
The Trigger class conceptualizes a trigger in GTRBAC. The class has triggeringEvent
and triggeredEvent properties.
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Figure 11: The GTRBAC Events
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Figure 12: The GTRBAC Restrictions
Trigger rdfs:subClassOf owl:Thing
triggeringEvent a rdfs:property, owl:objectProperty
rdfs:domain Trigger
rdfs:range Event
triggeredEvent a rdfs:property, owl:objectProperty
rdfs:domain Trigger
rdfs:range Event
Restrictions and Constraints: The restrictions and constraints, which are most im-
portant concepts in GTRBAC, represent temporal constraints in dierent ways as shown
Figure 13: The GTRBAC Constraints
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in Figure 12 and Figure 13 respectively. While there are several types of restrictions in
GTRBAC, we describe only role activation restrictions. The RoleActivationRestriction class
associates with RoleActivation and RoleDeactivation events.
RoleActivationRestriction rdfs:subClassOf owl:Thing
associatedWith a rdfs:Property, owl:ObjectProperty
rdfs:domain : RoleActivationRestriction;
rdfs:range : Event, owl:allValuesFrom: RoleActivation.
user a rdfs:Property, owl:ObjectProperty
rdfs:domain : RoleActivationRestriction;
rdfs:range : User, owl:maxCardinality:1.
restrictTo a rdfs:Property, owl:FunctionalProperty
rdfs:domain : RoleActivationRestriction;
rdfs:range : String, owl:DataRange:fPERROLE, PERUSERROLEg.
It has two subclasses according to the type of restriction; CardinalityRestriction and
DurationRestriction class. The former restricts role activation by using activeCardinality
property, while the latter uses activeDuration property.
The CardinalityRestriction is represented by two properties: activeCardinality and default-
Cardinality. The MaxNumberOfConcurrentActivationRestriction and TotalNum-
berOfActivationRestriction are dened as subclasses of CardinalityRestriction.
TheDurationRestriction is represented by activateDuration property. TheMaxRoleDu-
rationPerActivationRestriction and TotalActiveRoleDurationRestriction are de-
ned as subclasses of DurationRestriction.
The Constraint classes represent temporal policies in GTRBAC. Each Constraint class
is associated with only one event. The ActivationConstraint class is related to activation
events and it is described by associatedWith, canDuration, and restriction properties.
Constraint rdfs:subClassOf owl:Thing
ActivationConstraint rdfs:subClassOf Constraint
associatedWith a rdfs:Property, owl:ObjectProperty
rdfs:domain : Constraint;
rdfs:range : Event, owl:allValuesFrom: RoleActivation.
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canDuration a rdfs:Property, owl:ObjectProperty
rdfs:domain : ActivationConstraint;
rdfs:range : PeriodicTime.
restriction a rdfs:Property, owl:ObjectProperty
rdfs:domain : ActivationConstraint;
rdfs:range : RoleActivationRestriction.
It has two subclasses according to restriction type (duration or cardinality), Activa-
tionDurationConstraint and CardinalityConstraint which are described by restriction
property. TheMaxRoleDurationPerActivationConstraint and TotalActiveRoleDu-
rationConstraint are subclasses of ActivationDurationConstraint and theMaxNumberOf-
ConcurrentActivationConstraint andTotalNumberOfActivationConstraint are sub-
classes of CardinalityConstraint. They are distinguished by owl:allValuesFrom on restriction
property.
The TemporalConstraint classes are related to all events except (de)activation events.
TemporalConstraint rdfs:subClassOf Constraint
associatedWith a rdfs:Property, owl:ObjectProperty
rdfs:domain : Constraint;
rdfs:range : Event, owl:allValuesFrom: fUserRoleAssignment, UserRoleDeassignment,
RoleEnabling, RoleDisabling, RolePermissionAssignment, RolePermissionDeas-
signmentg.
The class is divided into two subclasses according to the type of restriction, DurationCon-
straint and PeriodicityConstraint. DurationConstraint class has two additional proper-
ties, canDuration and eventDuration. PeriodicityConstraint has periodicTime property in
order to represent periodic restrictions.
Enforcing Restrictions and Constraints
In this section, we apply the presented model to our example scenario. The followings
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x after, 10, MINUTE
Now that we have introduced an ontology to represent entities in the system and modeled
GTRBAC using OWL, we show how the policy management process works. In order to show
expressiveness power of the the proposed ontology, we have shown that how it can be used
to represent various models such as RBAC, constraints in RBAC, temporal constraints of
GTRBAC, etc.
One can specify policies in various models using OWL ontologies. We can specify the
policies using the general semantic based policy specication introduced in section 4.1.3.1
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which is compatible with XACML. The temporal constraint and GTRBAC policies could
be specied using ontologies described in section 4.1.3.3. The policies can also be specied
in RBAC using our proposed ontology or by employing existing approaches such as the
ROWLBAC model proposed by Finin et al. [99, 109]. Regardless of the model used for
specication, the policies will be transferred to RBAC policies and stored at the global
RBAC policy base. In order to do this, if GTRBAC is the model of choice, we can use the
approach proposed by Zhang et al. to convert GTRBAC policies into RBAC policies [42].
If we use XACML-compatible specication, we can use RBAC prole of XACML to convert
policies to RBAC policies [44].
Although in general the PMaaS and the SBPMS, which is an instance of the PMaaS,
do not impose any restriction on the policy specication, for simplicity purpose we assume
that the CSPs use RBAC model. All the policies are transferred to RBAC policies and
stored at the global RBAC policy base. Once the policies are at the global RBAC policy
base, they will be exported to associated local policy RBAC bases which in turn used by
their respective RBAC engines to make authorization decisions and enforce them. Note that
the access requesters in this case are sent to the CSP and policy decision and enforcement
processes are handled locally by the CSPs and only policy specication is done at the PMS.
Alternatively, we can perform decision making at the PMS side too. In this case, we
don't need to keep local RBAC policy bases at the CSPs; The access request are sent to the
PMS rather than individual CSPs, decisions are made at the PMS based on policies on the
global RBAC policy base, and the appropriate authorization decisions are communicated to
the RBAC engines of corresponding CSPs to enforce the decision.
4.1.4 Proof of Concept Implementation and Experimental Results
In this section, we explain a proof of concept implementation of our proposed system and
present our performance evaluation results.
Our proof of concept implementation includes developing a Java library to abstract the
proposed framework. The library provides an interface which enables the cloud users to
manage the ontologies, and specify the authorization policies. Our implementation contains
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Figure 14: The Implementation Architecture of the Proposed Framework
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two dierent Java based components: the CSP and the SBPMS. The SBPMS contains
authorization API, knowledge management and authorization GUI and the CSP contains
the provider authorization API, knowledge management and semantic based PDP.
As shown in Figure 14, the authorization API and the provider authorization API are
published using RESTful Web service technology to enable remote invocation of the methods
for the dierent entities involved. The reason we chose RESTful Web service technology is
that many cloud providers make use of RESTful architecture to provide RESTful APIs to
\execute services which can seamlessly scale and have modular architecture, ease of integra-
tion and extensibility" [59]. Cloud computing services by nature are distributed and use of
web-based RESTful APIs by cloud customers is a logical solution for cloud services [60]. A
RESTful Web service is implemented in the SBPMS side and the CSPs are implemented as
RESTful clients. The provider authorization API establishes a secure channel to the seman-
tic based policy management server using SSL. Authentication of the provider and server is
done using OAuth which is an open protocol to allow secure API authorization in a simple
and standard method from web applications and a simple way to publish and interact with
protected data [55]. The authorization API provides methods to insert, update, remove,
search and access information in the knowledge base.
Our proposed framework uses Protege which oers an optimized and ecient solution to
manage large knowledge bases with authorization information [54]. Protege is a Java tool
that provides an extensible architecture and a suite of tools for the creation of customized
knowledge-based applications with ontologies. We use Protege-OWL
(http://protege.stanford.edu/overview/protege-owl.html) that is an editor to enable users
to build ontologies for the Semantic Web, in particular in the OWL. It implements a rich
set of knowledge-modeling structures and actions that support the creation, visualization,
and manipulation of ontologies in various representation formats. For SWRL rules, our
implementation makes use of SWRLTab
(http://protege.cim3.net/cgi-bin/wiki.pl?SWRLTab) which is a development environment
for working with SWRL rules in Protege-OWL. It supports the editing and execution of
SWRL rules. Further, Protege can be extended by way of a plug-in architecture and a
Java-based API for building knowledge-based tools and applications.
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In order to reason over the ontologies represented in Protege-OWL, we use Jena [103]
and Pellet [53]. Jena is used as a Java API to manage ontologies and Pellet is used as
DL reasoner. The former is the standard Java library for ontology management while the
latter oers high expressiveness power when dealing with OWL 2 ontologies and performs
incremental consistency checking. Our implementation uses the Protege-OWL Reasoner API
(http://protegewiki.stanford.edu/wiki/ProtegeReasoner
API) that provides programmatic access to a reasoner. It provides methods for consistency
checking, classication, etc. of an ontology as well as methods for getting the inferred
information for a particular OWL entity. The ProtegePelletJenaReasoner implementation
converts a Protege-OWLmodel into a Jena model and then it uses the existing Pellet reasoner
connection available in Jena for the inference.
The authorization GUI is a graphical Web user interface that enables cloud users to
access authorization services in a usable way. Our implementation uses WebProtege
(http://protegewiki.stanford.edu/wiki/WebProtege) which is a lightweight, web-based ontol-
ogy editor developed to support the process of ontology development in a web environment.
The cloud users can use this interface to search the knowledge base, specify authorization
policies and request authorization proofs.
We used RESTful Web service technology because it allowed us to make use of existing
components and put them together to implement the proof of concept prototype and per-
form the simulations. A functioning system, however, needs to take into account features
and functionalities that are required for real world deployment. Actual deployment of the
proposed framework in practice is beyond scope of this dissertation.
The framework is developed to be used by cloud customers, both individual and en-
terprize customers. As mentioned before, it can be deployed as public cloud service or a
private cloud by enterprize. The eventual beneciary of the proposed framework are cloud
customers and it enables users to manage access policies to their resources.
After implementing our proof of concept prototype based on the architecture discussed
above, we present its performance evaluation. We used two dierent machines to do our
experiments: a server and a client.
The server is an Intel Core i5-520M 2.40 GHz with 8 Gbytes RAM and Windows 7
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Ultimate running the SBPMS server. The client is an AMD Opteron 252 2.60 GHz with
8 Gbytes RAM and Windows 7 Ultimate running an application that simulates CSPs that
utilize the SBPMS server using the authorization client API. The SBPMS is launched as a
web service and the simulator starts 100 threads each representing a CSP using the policy
management system. All the threads are run in parallel to stress the policy management
system with simultaneous invocations.
Ontology and Policy Generation Process
Since we did not have any real data, we simulated OWL les and SWRL rules. We
generated 100 separate OWL les, one for each CSP and 200 SWRL rules using those OWL
les. In order to do this, we used the semantic based specication introduced in section 4.1.3
based on the meta-model shown in Figure 6.
In the data simulation process, we dened all entities in OWL ontology, their properties,
relationships, etc. We generated instances of these classes including 100 providers, 500
subjects, 2000 objects, 8 actions and between 1 and 10 services for each CSP. These services
are randomly assigned to the CSPs and each of the 100 providers has at least 1 and at most
10 services. The actions we used in data generation process are read, write, execute, parallel
write, parallel read, parallel execute, parallel read and write, parallel read and execution. This
data was generated and stored at 100 separate OWL les each associated with one CSP. Note
that these OWL les are not completely dierent and there are some similarities among them
as in real world scenarios where users have similar resources stored at multiple CSPs.
Our next step in data generation was to generate SWRL rules. These rules are generated
using the meta-model described in Figure 6. We generated 200 SWRL rules based on the
data generated in OWL les.
Performance of the Ontology Construction
In order to enable users to specify their access policy rules, the SBPMS rst needs to
provide them with information about all their resources. In this process, that is done only
once at the beginning of the deployment of the framework, the SBPMS connects to knowledge
bases of all the CSPs and retrieves information about all the resources the user has stored
at the CSPs. This is essentially a construction of the global ontology in which the SBPMS























Figure 15: Global Ontology Construction Time
used for policy specication by the user. Figure 15 shows the performance of this process. As
we can see, for the rst CSP it takes less than 100 milliseconds to fetch required information
to the server. For 10 CSPs, it takes about 300 milliseconds and for 40 CSPs the time it
takes to fetch the ontologies is 1 second. For 100 CSPs, it takes less than 3.5 seconds to
fetch all the ontologies stored at all the CSPs to the server; This may seem hight but we
believe considering the large number of CSPs and size of the OWL les, it is an acceptable
and reasonable performance. Also, note that this process is done only once at the beginning
of the deployment of the framework.
Performance of the Authorization API
Next, we looked at performance of the authorization API and the provider authorization
API. Whenever there is a change in one of the CSPs, for example, user adds a new object,
adds a new subject, etc, we need to update the OWL le in the SBPMS side to reect these
changes. This experiment simulates the pull strategy that was discussed earlier. The results
of this experiment are shown in Figure 16. As can be seen, when there is only one CSP it
takes only 75 milliseconds to update the ontology base of the SBPMS server. If we increase
the number of CSPs to 40, it takes 150 milliseconds to update the server. As demonstrated,
if we increase the number of CSPs to 100, the time it takes to update the server when there















































Figure 17: SWRL Rules Update Time
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Similar to OWL les, when there is a change in SWRL rules at the SBPMS side, for
example user adds a new rule, modies an existing rule, deletes a rule, etc, these changes
need to be reected at the CSPs side too. The SBPMS should update SWRL rules les of
the CSPs that are related to the change (determined by policy association module of the
framework). This experiment simulates the push strategy that was discussed in section 4.3.
The results of this experiment are shown in Figure 17. As it can be seen, for 100 CSPs
it takes less than 200 milliseconds to update the policy base of the CSPs when there is a
change in the policy base of the SBPMS server and the number of the CSPs does not have
much eect on performance of this process.
Note that for all the experiments, we ran each of them ve rounds and the results
reported here are average of those ve rounds of experiments. Overall, the results show
that our proposed framework performs well and the time required for policy management is
reasonable.
4.2 POLICY EVOLUTION COMPONENT
As it was discussed before, once RBAC is in place, maintenance of the system and dealing
with policy evolution become important issues [89]. In this dissertation, we use the idea
of role mining to deal with the policy evolution issues. Although there have been several
attempts for role mining, there is no formal notion of goodness of a produced role set.
Furthermore, the existing approaches do not consider the existing RBAC conguration and
try to dene everything from scratch, which is not acceptable for organizations that already
have an RBAC system in place.
In this section, we formally dene the problem of mining role hierarchy with minimal
perturbation and present StateMiner, a heuristic solution to nd an RBAC state as similar
as possible to both the existing state and the optimal state. In order to achieve our goal,
we use the theory of formal concept analysis [94], which has been shown to provide a strong
theoretical foundation for role engineering [89]. We also introduce two dierent measures:
structural complexity for optimality of an RBAC state, and similarity of sets of roles for
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minimal perturbation. Our proposed algorithm, StateMiner, presents a heuristic solution to
nd an RBAC state as close as possible to both the deployed RBAC state and the optimal
state. We then present evaluations and experimental results to demonstrate the eectiveness
of our approach.
4.2.1 Overview: Formal Concept Analysis
In this section, we review the theory of formal concept analysis on which our work is based.
The input to formal concept analysis is called a formal context and dened as follows:
DEFINITION 1. A formal context is a triple (G;M; I) where G and M are sets and
I  G M is a binary relation between G and M . The elements of G and M are called
objects and attributes respectively. For g 2 G and m 2M , we write gIm when (g;m) 2 I.
In role mining, we see the user-permission relation as a formal context, where G is the
set of all users, and M is the set of all permissions, and (g;m) 2 I if and only if the user
corresponding to g has the permission corresponding to m.
DEFINITION 2. A concept of the context (G;M; I) is a pair (X; Y ), where X  G
and Y M satisfy the following properties:
Y = fm 2M j(8g 2 X) gImg, i.e., Y is the set of all attributes shared by all objects in X
X = fg 2 Gj(8m 2 Y ) gImg, i.e., X is the set of all objects that share all attributes in Y .
X and Y are also called the extent and the intent of the concept (X; Y ) respectively. The
set of all concepts of the context is denoted by B(G;M; I). A concept (X1; Y1) is called a
subconcept of (X2; Y2), shown as (X1; Y1)  (X2; Y2) if and only if X1  X2 (or, equivalently,
Y2  Y1). For example, Figure 18(b) shows the permissions associated with users as per
Figure 1(a); here (fU4; U5g; fP1; P2; P11; P12g) is not a concept, because U3; U6 also have the
permissions fP1; P2; P11; P12g. The pair (fU3; U4; U5; U6g; fP1; P2; P11;
P12g) is a concept. The family of concepts complies the mathematical axioms dening a
lattice, and is called a concept lattice. The concept lattice for the state in Figure 18(a) is
shown in Figure 18(c). In this gure, the number to the right indicates the role, the rst
line shows the permissions assigned to the role, and the second line shows the users assigned
to the role. In this concept lattice, each concept inherits all the permissions associated with
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its subconcepts, and users are inherited in the other direction. Therefore, we can remove
redundant permissions and users from each node. The result is called the reduced concept
lattice and is given in Figure 18(d).
The reduced concept lattice denes a complete RBAC state. Each concept represents
a role and the lattice can be viewed as the role hierarchy. In this RBAC state, each user
is assigned to exactly one role, and each permission is assigned to exactly one role and the
subconcept relation corresponds to the role inheritance relation. It is clear that the reduced
concept lattice provides the semantic relationships among concepts and has more meanings
than just a set of permissions. Using the reduced concept lattice as the role hierarchy has
the disadvantage that the role hierarchy may be extremely large. In the reduced concept
lattice, some concepts introduce no new users, no new permissions, or neither. However, it is
not correct to remove all concepts with no new users or new permissions. We need to have a
measure to compare the dierent role hierarchies generated from the reduced concept lattice
and identify which one is more desirable which we will discuss in next section.
4.2.2 The Problem of Mining Role Hierarchy with Minimal Perturbation
In this section, we rst dene the role mining problem with minimal perturbation, then
introduce two measures: one to measure goodness of an RBAC state and another to measure
perturbation. Then, we formally dene the problem of mining role hierarchy with minimal
perturbation.
DEFINITION 3. Given an RBAC state  = hR;UA; PA
;RHi, nd a new RBAC state that is consistent with access control conguration  =
hU; P; UP i and is as close as possible to the existing RBAC state.
The RBAC state is consistent with  if every user in U has the same set of authorized
permissions in the RBAC state as in UP .
We adopt the example from [89] to use in this dissertation.
Example:. The original RBAC state is shown in Figure 18(a) which includes 10 users,
12 permissions, and 7 roles. Figure 18(b) shows the user-permission relation (UP ) resulting
from this state.
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4.2.2.1 A Measure for Goodness of an RBAC State An RBAC state is shown as
 = hR;UA; PA;RHi, where R is a set of roles, UA  U  R is the user-role assignment
relation, PA  R  P is the role-permission assignment relation, RH  R  R is a partial
order over R, which is called a role hierarchy. Also an access control conguration is shown
as  = hU; P; UP i, where U is a set of users, P is a set of permissions, and UP is the user-
permission assignment relation. Given an access control conguration, many RBAC states
may be consistent with it. We need a to have a measurement of how good an RBAC state
is in order to select among them.
Several metrics have been dened in the literature to measure goodness of identied
roles. Vaidya et al. [81] suggest to minimize the number of roles. Zhang et al. [83] ,
Ene et al. [87], and Lu et al. [85] aim to minimize the number of user-role assignment
and permission-role assignment relations. In [84] Colantino et al. describe a measure that
minimize the administration cost of the resulting RBAC model. In [89]Molloy et al. propose
the notion of weighted structural complexity that sums up the number of relationships in an
RBAC state, with adjustable weights for dierent kinds of relationships. In [86] Guo et al.
suggest to minimize the number of roles and the edges in role hierarchy graph. They argue
that including UA and PA in weighted structural complexity is redundant because the role
hierarchy incorporates the information represented by them. We believe that this argument
does not hold as role hierarchy represents only relations between roles, while UA and PA
are part of administration cost as well. The weighted structural complexity proposed in [89]
allows direct user-permission assignments which we believe should not be allowed, because it
is not clear when we should use roles and when we should use direct assignment of permissions
to users; moreover, it defeats the purpose of RBAC.
Considering all the aforementioned metrics, the weighted structural complexity is the
most general and most exible measure that covers other measures as well. In order to have
a measure, we adopt the notion of the weighted structural complexity as a measurement of
goodness of an RBAC state, but unlike the approach by Molloy et al. in [89] we do not allow
direct user permission assignments. The weighted structural complexity (WSC) is formally
dened as follows:
DEFINITION 4. Given W = hwr; wu; wp; whi, where wr; wu; wp; wh 2 Q+ [ f1g,
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(b) The User-Permission Relation
1 {P1, P11, P12}
{U1, U2, U3, U4, U5, U6, U7, U8, U9, U10}
9  {P1, P2, P4, P5, P7, P10, P11, P12}
{U5, U6}
3 {P1, P4, P7, P11, P12}
{U5, U6, U7, U8, U9, U10}
{}
5 {P1, P4, P7, P10, P11, P12}
{U5, U6, U7, U8}
12 {P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, P6, P7, P8, P9, P10, P11, P12}
{}
6 {P1, P4, P7, P8, P9, P10, P11, P12}
{U8}
4 {P1, P4, P7, P8, P9, P11, P12}
{U8, U9, U10}
8 {P1, P2, P4, P5, P11, P12}
{U4, U5, U6}
7 {P1, P2, P11, P12}
{U3, U4, U5, U6}
10 {P1, P3, P6, P11, P12}
{U1, U2, U3}
11 {P1, P2, P3, P6, P11, P12}
{U3}
2 {P1, P4, P11, P12}
{U4, U5, U6,U7, U8, U9, U10}
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(d) The Reduced Concept Lattice
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1 {P1, P11, P12}
{}
(e) The StateMiner Result for wf=0
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1 {P1, P11, P12}
{}
(f) The StateMiner Result for wf=1
Figure 18: Example: The Original and Resulting RBAC States
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the weighted structural complexity of an RBAC state , which is denoted as wsc(;W ), is
computed as follows:
wsc(;W ) = wr  jRj+ wu  jUAj+ wp  jPAj+ wh  jt r(RH)j
where Q+ is the set of all non-negative rational numbers, j:j indicates the size of the set
or relation, and t r(RH) indicates the transitive reduction of role-hierarchy.
A transitive reduction is the minimal set of relationships that describes the same hierar-
chy. For example, t r(f(r1; r2);
(r2; r3); (r1; r3)g) = f(r1; r2); (r2; r3)g, as (r1; r3) can be inferred.
It is possible to adjust the weights of wsc to limit the RBAC states to meet dierent
objectives. For example, by setting wh to 1, we can force a at RBAC state since each
role inheritance relation costs 1 or by setting wr = 1; wu = wp = 0, and wh = 1, we can
minimize the number of roles.
4.2.2.2 A Measure for Minimal Perturbation Since we aim to mine role hierarchy
with minimal perturbation, we dene a metric to measure perturbation. For this, we need
to nd a way to measure similarity between the identied role set and the existing role
set. In [88] Vaidya et al. use Jaccard Coecient, a well known metric to compare the
similarity of sample tests, to measure similarity between roles and role sets. Although
Jaccard Coecient is quiet straightforward, in general, it is too simple to measure similarity
of sets of roles. Moreover, they only consider permissions directly assigned to roles while
permissions acquired indirectly through role hierarchy relationships should also be taken
into account. Even though role is basically a set of permissions, when it comes to computing
similarity between roles, it is important to consider their positions in role hierarchies as well
as the users who can acquire the roles.
We dene a exible and general measure for similarity between roles and role sets that
takes into account users and permissions associated with roles as well as relations in role
hierarchy with adjustable weights. First, we dene a similarity measure between two roles
and then extend it to two role sets. For similarity between two roles, we rst dene similarity
based on permissions, users and relations in the role hierarchy individually, and then combine
them to get a composite similarity measure.
89
Permission centric similarity between roles r1 and r2 is dened based on authorized
permissions for roles as: PermSim(r1; r2) =
jrp1\rp2j
jrp1[rp2j where rp1 is the set of all permissions
authorized for role r1 (authorized permissions(r1)) and rp2 is the set of all permissions
authorized for role r2 (authorized permissions(r2)).
User centric similarity between roles r1 and r2 is dened based on authorized users
for roles as: UserSim(r1; r2) =
jru1\ru2j
jru1[ru2j where ru1 is the set of all users authorized for role r1
(authorized users(r1)) and ru2 is the set of all users authorized for role r2 (authorized users(r2)).
One may say that two completely dierent roles maybe assigned to the same set of users
leading to high UserSim value which with a weight of 1=3 may outweigh the overall role
similarity value. Although it is possible in theory, in reality if two completely dierent roles
have same sets of authorized users, which we use in our approach instead of assigned users,
they can be integrated to produce a more optimal RBAC state. Note that our goal here is
to compare two sets of roles for the same organization and if two roles have same sets of
authorized users it is very likely that they are similar roles and should have high value of
similarity.
Hierarchy Relation centric similarity between roles r1 and r2 is dened based on




max(jJun(r1)j;jJun(r2)j)  12 where Sen(r) and Jun(r) are the sets of immediate seniors and
immediate juniors of role r respectively.
Since role hierarchies capture functional semantics in an organization, by including hier-
archy relation centric similarity, we aim to retain this functional semantics in our measure.
In measuring this similarity value, we assign same weights to senior and junior roles in a
hierarchy. However, they could be adjusted depending on the needs of a system.
Now, by combining all these measures, we dene similarity between two roles as a value
between 0 and 1 as follows:
DEFINITION 5 (Role-Role Similarity). For any two roles r1 and r2, we dene
similarity measure between them as: sim(r1; r2) = PermSim(r1; r2)wsp+UserSim(r1; r2)
wsu +RelSim(r1; r2)  wsh where wsp + wsu + wsh = 1.
In our experiments, we set the weights as wsp = wsu = wsh =
1
3
. However, they could be
adjusted based on the system and application requirements. When two roles are identical
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with regards to all permissions, users and relations, their similarity is 1 (such as role \Em-
ployee" in Figure 18(a) and role \3" in Figure 18(d)), and when two roles have mutually
exclusive permission sets, mutually exclusive user sets and have no similar relations in the
hierarchy, their similarity is 0.
Measuring the similarity between two sets of roles is a signicantly more complex task
than measuring the similarity between two roles. It is not clear whether a single role cor-
responds to only one other role or to a set of roles. Similarly, it is unclear if a role can
be matched to more than one roles in the other role set. We extend Role-Role Similarity
measure to measure similarity between two sets of roles; we compute similarity value for
each pair of roles in both role sets, sort them and then pick the maximum similarity value
of pairs of roles and take their average. A key issue is deciding how many of these similarity
values should be taken into account specially when two role sets have dierent numbers of
roles. Two intuitive approaches would be as follows:
(1) take smaller role set and compute the average over maximum similarity values for
each role in this set. However, this is not a good measure when we have the larger second set
and maximum similarity value for each role of the rst set turns out to be 1 (i.e., each role
in the rst set has an exactly matching role in the second set). The two sets have similarity
value of 1 indicates that they are exactly similar - which is not the case as the set sizes are
dierent (VAG algorithm, the approach proposed by Vaidya et al. in [88], falls into this
category as it considers average over the size of the mined set, which could be the smaller
set).
(2) take average over similarity values of all pairs of roles from the two sets. This can
be bad in several situations. For instance, consider a scenario with two exactly similar role
sets with identical roles which are disjoint from each other. In such a case, for each role in
the rst role set there is exactly one role in the second role set for which similarity value is 1
and for all other roles similarity value is 0. Hence, if we take the average over all pairs, the
nal similarity value here would be 1jrsj (jrsj is size of the role sets), which is not an intuitive
value to indicate exactly matching sets.
91
Algorithm 1 Similarity: Sim(rs1; rs2)
Input: two role sets rs1; rs2 where rs1 is the smaller role set
Input: weights for permissions, users and relations hwsp; wsu; wshi
Input: t as threshold





6: for each role r1 2 rs1 do
7: rp1  authorized permissions(r1)
8: ru1  authorized users(r1)
9: for each role r2 2 rs2 do
10: rp2  authorized permissions(r2)
11: ru2  authorized users(r2)
12: npi  jrp1 \ rp2j
13: nui  jru1 \ ru2j
14: npu  jrp1 [ rp2j






max(jSen(r1)j;jSen(r2)j)  12 +
min(jJun(r1)j;jJun(r2)j)
max(jJun(r1)j;jJun(r2)j)  12










Algorithm 1 Similarity: Sim(rs1; rs2) (continued)
28: for each role r2 2 rs2 that has not been matched do
29: MaxSim Maxr12rs1SimMatrix[r1][r2]
30: if MaxSim  t then
31: Avgsim Avgsim+MaxSim






Ideally, we want every role to contribute to the nal similarity measure. Wa propose the
following approach to measure the similarity between two role sets rs1 and rs2. Without
loss of generality, we assume that rs1 is the smaller role set.
DEFINITION 6 (Role Set-Role Set Similarity). For any two role sets rs1 and rs2
where rs1 is the smaller role set, we compute similarity between them as follows:
Step 1: 8ri 2 rs1, nd Maxrj2rs2sim(ri; rj) such that for all selected pairs (ri; rj) and
(rx; ry), if ri 6= rx then rj 6= ry. In this step every role in rs1 is matched with exactly one
distinct role in rs2, but there are some roles in rs2 that have not been matched with any
role from rs1.
Step 2: For those roles in rs2 that have not been matched in the rst step, we consider
only the roles that have a similarity value above a predened threshold.
Step 3: Finally, take the average over all of the chosen similarity values.
In Step 2, two naive approaches could be to include all the roles for computing the
similarity values or ignore all of them; each of which has disadvantages. If we ignore all of
them there maybe some roles with high similarity values that do not contribute to the nal
similarity value. Similarly, if we include all of them there maybe some roles with very low
similarity values that lead to a low overall similarity value. Therefore, we use a threshold
based approach. In our experiments we use t = 0:5 as threshold and in Step 2 consider only
the roles that have a similarity value above 0:5.
We also dene the dissimilarity between two role sets as follows: dissim(rs1; rs2) =
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1  sim(rs1; rs2). The algorithm for computing similarity is shown in Algorithm 1.
4.2.2.3 Global Optimization Function In general, the problem of mining role hierar-
chy with minimal perturbation can be seen as a multi objective optimization problem that
aims to trade-o conicting objectives [95]. Usually there are a number of objectives that
should be minimized or maximized. Here we have two objectives: (1) minimize the weighted
structural complexity of the resulting RBAC state, and (2) maximize the similarity (min-
imize the dissimilarity) between identied roles and the existing roles. The simplest way
to dene a global optimum is to compute a weighted sum of all the objective functions.
The weighted similarity is a number between 0 and 1 but the wsc is not, so we multiply
sim by wsc to bring both numbers to a comparable range. We dene the following global
optimization function:
Denition 7 (Global Optimization Function). Given a weighted structural com-
plexity, wsc, of an RBAC state, and a dissimilarity measure, dissim, between two sets of
roles, global optimization function is dened as:
GOF (wsc; dissim) = (1   wf)  wsc + wf  wsc  dissim where wf 2 [0; 1] is a user
dened weighting factor for the similarity.
As we mentioned before, dissim(rs1; rs2) = 1   sim(rs1; rs2), so by replacing dissim
with sim the global optimization function can be computed by GOF (wsc; sim) = wsc (1 
wf  sim):
As we can see, if the weight factor for similarity is zero (wf = 0), we have GOF = wsc
which means we do not care about how similar the result is to the existing conguration and
the only important measure here is weighted structural complexity. Also if the weight factor
for similarity is one (wf = 1), we have GOF = wsc  dissim which means we do not care
about structural complexity of the result; the only important measure in this case is dissim.
In the later case as we multiplied dissim by wsc to bring both measure to the same range,
we can delete wsc, so we have GOF = dissim = 1   sim. We now dene the problem of
mining role hierarchy with minimal perturbation as follows:
Denition 8 (The problem of Mining Role Hierarchy with Minimal Pertur-
bation). Given a deployed RBAC state dpl = hRdpl; UAdpl; PAdpl; RHdpli and a system
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conguration  = hU; P; UP i, nd an RBAC state new = hRnew; UAnew; PAnew; RHnewi
consistent with UP such that it minimizes GOF (wsc(new;W ); dissim(Rdpl; Rnew)) =
wsc(new;W )  (1  wf  sim(Rdpl; Rnew)).
The goal of mining role hierarchy with minimal perturbation is to minimize the global
optimization function of the predened optimality measure (i.e., weighted structural com-
plexity of new) and the predened perturbation measure (i.e., dissimilarity between Rdpl
and Rnew).
4.2.3 The StateMiner Algorithm
In this section, we present a heuristic algorithm to nd a set of roles satisfying the goals
of mining role hierarchy with minimal perturbation. The algorithm consists of two phases.
In the rst phase, we generate the reduced concept lattice using the deployed conguration,
which gives us an RBAC state. In the second phase, we prune this lattice and select the
nal RBAC state. In order to do this, we use a greedy algorithm to heuristically optimize
the lattice.
Once we have the reduced concept lattice, we should decide which roles are appropriate
and which ones should be removed. Removing each role reduces the cost of creating the role
and the associated relationships. However, we need to add back some relationships so that
user-permission assignment relation and the inheritance relation remain correct. We use one
general pruning rule: we remove role r from the reduced concept lattice when the value of
the GOF decreases after removing that role.
StateMiner as shown in Algorithm 2 is a greedy algorithm; it iterates over all of the
roles in the reduced concept lattice and performs pruning if the change will decrease global
optimization function of wsc of the RBAC state and the similarity between the deployed
role set and the role sets with and without that role. It stops when no more operations can
be performed. Since if a role r in the reduced concept lattice has no new permissions and
no new users, it is more likely to be removed, we rst check this kind of roles. Next, we
check roles with no new permissions, roles with no new users, and nally roles with both new
permissions and new users. Unlike StateMiner, HierarchicalMiner [89] does not consider the
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Algorithm 2 Minimal Perturbation Problem in Presence of Role Hierarchy:
StateMiner(;W;wf)
Input: current RBAC state dpl = hRdpl; UAdpl; PAdpl; RHdpli
Input: weight factors for complexity, W hwr; wu; wp; whi
Input: system conguration  = hU; P; UP i
Input: weight factor for similarity, wf 2 [0; 1]
1: create reduced concept lattice rcl = hRrcl; UArcl; PArcl; RHrcli
2: Sort Rrcl such that order is rst roles with neither new
3: users nor new permissions, roles with no new permissions,
4: permissions, roles with no new users, and nally
5: roles with both new users and new permissions
6: wscbefore  wsc(rcl;W )
7: simbefore  sim(Rdpl; Rrcl)
8: new  rcl
9: for each role r 2 Rrcl do
10: Sen(r) fri 2 Rrclj(ri; r) 2 t r(RHrcl)g
11: Jun(r) frj 2 Rrclj(r; rj) 2 t r(RHrcl)g
12: rp assigned permissions(r)
13: ru assigned users(r)
14: 8u 2 ru 8ri 2 Jun(r) UAnew  UAnew [ (u; ri)
15: 8u 2 ru UAnew  UAnew n f(u; r)g
16: 8p 2 rp 8rj 2 Sen(r) PAnew  PAnew [ (p; rj)
17: 8p 2 rp PAnew  PAnew n f(p; r)g
18: 8ri 2 Sen(r) 8rj 2 Jun(r) RHnew  RHnew [ (ri; rj)
19: 8ri 2 Sen(r) RHnew  RHnew n f(ri; r)g
20: 8rj 2 Jun(r) RHnew  RHnew n f(r; rj)g
21: Rnew  Rnew n frg
22: Compute t r(RHnew)
23: wscafter  wsc(new;W )
24: simafter  sim(Rdpl; Rnew)
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Algorithm 2 Minimal Perturbation Problem in Presence of Role Hierarchy:
StateMiner(;W;wf) (continued)
25: if wscafter  (1  wf  simafter) < wscbefore  (1  wf  simbefore) then
26: rcl  new
27: wscbefore  wscafter




concepts with both new users and new permissions in the pruning process.
If we run the algorithm using the original RBAC state in Figure 18(a), the conguration
in Figure 18(b), wr = wu = wp = wh = 1, the output is shown in Figures 18(e) and 18(f)
for and wf = 0 and wf = 1 respectively. As we mentioned before, when wf = 0 the
only important measure is weighted structural complexity. The original RBAC state (Figure
18(a)) has wsc = 40, the one found by HierchicalMiner [89] has wsc = 40, while the one
found by StateMiner (Figure 18(e)) has wsc = 37. Moreover, as shown in Figure 18(f) when
wf = 1 the mined RBAC state is exactly same as the original one and has wsc = 40.
Time Complexity
As the StateMiner algorithm has two phases, its computational complexity depends on
the complexity of the generation of the reduced concept lattice and the pruning process. The
time complexity for generating the reduced concept lattice is linear in the size of the lattice.
Since every concept in the reduced concept lattice is a role, the size of the lattice is the
number of roles. The number of roles in the worst case equals the number of permissions, n,
when each permission is a role by its own. As the algorithm iterates n times during pruning
process, the worst case cost is O(n2) where n is the number of permissions in the system.
4.2.4 Evaluation and Experimental Results
We have implemented the proposed algorithm. For generating concepts we use Colibri-Java
by Daniel Gotzmann [97] which is based on [96]. The heuristic approach for pruning is
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written in Java too and implements parsing, data structures, and the algorithms.
In this section, we evaluate the eectiveness of the StateMiner algorithm. The dataset
we use is a synthetic dataset used to evaluate the HiararchicalMiner by Molloy et al. [89].
The data set contains 493 users and 56 permissions. As we mentioned earlier, the goal of the
StateMiner algorithm is to nd an RBAC state that has the smallest weighted structural
complexity and is as similar as possible to the existing RBAC state. By tuning the weight
factor, organizations can set their priorities on the relative importance of maintaining the
resulting state against the cost of changing the current state. It means that an organization
can tune the trade-o between the maintenance cost and the change over cost. Furthermore,
by assigning weight factors for complexity they can set priorities on the importance of each
kind of relationship in the system.
Table 2 shows the weighted structural complexities of the original RBAC state and the
states generated by StateMiner for dierent similarity weight factors. We also include the
result for HierarchicalMiner and Optimal search algorithm that aims to nd optimal RBAC
state [89]. As we discussed in section 4.2.2.3 if the weight factor for similarity is zero (wf
= 0), the only important measure here is weighted structural complexity and StateMiner
covers HierarchicalMiner algorithm. We can see that StateMiner with wf = 0 has smaller
wsc than the HierarchicalMiner and is closer to the optimal solution. The reason is that in
the pruning process, StateMiner considers roles with both new users and new permissions
while HierarchicalMiner does not. Note that StateMiner with wf  0:4 has larger wsc than
HierarchicalMiner. This is to be expected as HierarchicalMiner does not consider existing
RBAC state while StateMiner does and when we aim to to keep the identied role set closer
to the original state the cost will be more with regards to wsc. For the same reason, as wf
increases, wsc increases as well.
Since the VAG algorithm [88] is the only algorithm in the literature that considers existing
roles in mining process, we have compared our proposed similarity measure with theirs. The
VAG algorithm only supports at RBAC and considers only permissions directly assigned to
roles while in our proposed similarity measure permissions acquired indirectly through role
hierarchy relationships are also considered as well as positions of roles in role hierarchy and
users who can acquire the roles. In order to compare the two measures, we implemented
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Table 2: The StateMiner Algorithm Experimental Results
W = f1; 1; 1; 1g W = f1; 1; 2; 2g
R UA PA RH WSC R UA PA RH WSC
Original a 32 799 35 19 885 32 799 35 19 939
wf=0 22 493 67 20 602 21 498 67 18 689
wf=0.1 21 498 67 18 604 21 498 67 18 689
wf=0.2 22 498 65 20 605 22 498 65 20 690
wf=0.3 21 498 65 18 605 22 498 65 20 690
wf=0.4 21 498 70 18 607 22 498 65 20 690
wf=0.5 21 498 70 19 608 22 498 68 20 696
wf=0.6 21 498 70 19 608 22 498 68 20 696
wf=0.7 23 498 65 25 611 22 498 68 21 698
wf=0.8 23 498 65 25 611 23 498 66 23 699
wf=0.9 24 498 63 27 612 24 498 63 27 702
wf=1 24 498 63 27 612 24 498 63 27 702
HierarchicalMiner 21 498 67 19 605 21 505 67 20 696
optimal 19 496 59 14 600 19 496 57 16 685
aNumbers of roles (R) and user-permission assignment relations (PA) in original state are dierent from
the ones reported in table 2 in [89]. We believe our numbers are correct because if we calculate total cost using
reported numbers in [89], it is 905 instead of 875 (22+ 799+ 65+ 19+ 0 = 905) in case of W = f1; 1; 1; 1; 1g


















Figure 19: Comparison with VAG
the VAG algorithm and applied it to the same data set as our proposed algorithm. The
goal is to compare the resulting mined role sets of the two approaches with the existing
role set and determine which one generates a role set more similar to the existing role set.
Figure 19 shows similarity of the mined RBAC state using our proposed similarity measure
and using VAG algorithm. We observe that compared to the VAG algorithm, our approach
provides better results and the mined roles of our proposed similarity measure are closer to
the original state.
Figure 21 depicts the roles related to students portion of the original and generated states;
Figure 21(a) shows the original RBAC state while gure 21(b) and 21(c) show the mined
results of StateMiner for wf = 0 and W = f1; 1; 1; 1g and W = f1; 1; 2; 2g respectively. We
can see that StateMiner produces semantically meaningful roles. Figure 21(b) represents the
same result produced by HierarchicalMiner. This is because wf = 0.
We have also run some experiments to check the eect of weight factor on the results.
Figure 20 showsGOF as a function of the similarity weight factor. As expected, by increasing
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Figure 21: Mining Results for the University Dataset
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5.0 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this dissertation, we proposed research tasks to address challenges in policy management
and access control in cloud computing environments. In particular, we addressed challenges
related to unied policy management and policy specication, and policy evolution.
With regards to Task I, we proposed Policy Management as a Service (PMaaS), a cloud
based policy management framework that puts users in full control of their resources which
may be scattered across multiple CSPs. It is designed to give cloud users a unied control
point for specifying authorization policies, who and what can get access to their data, content,
and services, no matter where all those things live on the Cloud. It relies on a user's centrally
located policy manager of those resources and enables users to manage access policies using
a centralized policy manager which provides capabilities for specifying access policies and
exporting them to the CSPs on behalf of the user.
Then, we presented lessons we learned from a case study where we implemented a uni-
ed policy management system for various real world CSPs. Based on those lessons and
motivated by limitations of existing approaches, we proposed a semantic based policy man-
agement framework that is designed to help CSPs to dene and manage security policies
using semantic web technologies and allows interoperation among dierent CSPs. We pre-
sented our proposed framework and described its components. We also introduced semantic
based policy specication to provide a common understandable semantic basis for policy
specication in cloud computing environments. Moreover, we dened OWL ontologies that
represent temporal constraints in GTRBAC and show how they can be used to specify and
model temporal constraints. Furthermore, we presented a proof of concept implementation
of the proposed framework to show its applicability and reported results of the experiments
we performed to evaluate performance of the framework.
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With regards to Task II, we discussed how to use role mining techniques for policy evo-
lution purpose. We formally dened the problem of mining a role hierarchy with minimal
perturbation. We also introduced two measures: a measure for goodness of an RBAC state
and a measure for minimal perturbation, then based on these measures we developed StateM-
iner, a heuristic solution to nd an RBAC state as close as possible to both the deployed
RBAC state and the optimal state. We also performed some experiments to demonstrate
the eectiveness of the proposed algorithm.
There are several future work related to the research presented in this dissertation. First,
We can extend the PMaaS by oering policy recommendation capabilities where the frame-
work can analyze the policies dened by user and use machine learning techniques for ex-
ample to predict policies and recommend them to user. Of course, user will have the option
to reject or modify the recommended policies.
Second, our approach in policy evolution component does not consider separation of duty
constraints and it is not clear what eects this migration will have on the existing separation
of duty constraints. It could be extended to consider separation of duty constrains and their
eects in the process of migrating to RBAC.
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